

SEDAT LAÇİNER & AHMET DOĞRU

# FINANCING THE PKK TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING







**Sedat Laçiner**  
**Ahmet Doğru**



## About the Authors

---

**Sedat Laçiner** is an academic, columnist and author with particular reference to Turkish foreign policy and the Middle East. Prof. Dr. Laçiner studied at Ankara University where he got his BA, as well as the University of Sheffield where he was awarded an MA in International Politics (with distinction), and King's College London, where he gained his PhD.

He is the author/co-author or editor of numerous books and articles in Turkish and in English, including "Iraq Global War and Turkey", "The Iraq Crisis", "Turks and Armenians", "The World and Turkey", "European Union with Turkey, Turkey's Membership's Impact on the EU".

Laçiner was awarded as Young Global Leader 2006 (by the World Economic Forum) in the category of intellectuals. Prof. Laçiner was appointed president of the Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University in 2011 and became the youngest rector in Turkey.

Since 2001, he has been teaching International Relations and International Security at the Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University.

Prof. Dr. Laçiner currently writes a weekly column for *The Turkish Sun* and *Haberdar* online newspapers. Laciner has written extensively on foreign affairs, the Middle East, globalization, and education issues.

---

**Ahmet Doğru** studied at Bilkent University (B.A). He completed his M.A degree in Middle Eastern Technical University. He studied Armenian nationalism and the Karabakh conflict during his master study.

He is a Ph.D. candidate at International Relations Department of Gazi University. His research interests in PhD. studies concentrates on Iranian foreign and security policy. He is the Editor-in-Chief and columnist of *The Turkish Sun* online newspaper







# **FINANCING THE PKK TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING**

**Sedat Laçiner & Ahmet Doğru**



Ankara, 2016



## Financing The PKK Terrorism and Drug Trafficking

Prof. Dr. Sedat Laçiner & Ahmet Doğru

### **Cover Design**

Önder Çukurluöz

### **Graphic Design**

Karınca Creative Ajans

**ISBN: 978-605-9642-17-0**

**Press:** Eflal Matbaacılık

**Certificate No:** 29527

Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak 56/1 Kızılay/Ankara/Turkey  
Phone: +90 312 431 54 83 / Fax: +90 312 431 54 84  
[www.karincayayinlari.net](http://www.karincayayinlari.net) - [info@karincaajans.net](mailto:info@karincaajans.net)

**The Turkish Sun**

The Turkish Sun is a daily English-language online newspaper offering a signature mix of news reporting and commentary on politics, international affairs, economics, popular culture, sports and the arts, science and technology, and business.

[www.theturkishsun.com](http://www.theturkishsun.com) - [info@theturkishsun.com](mailto:info@theturkishsun.com)

# Contents

PREFACE.....	xiii
--------------	------

ABBREVIATIONS.....	xv
--------------------	----

## PART I

Introduction: Global Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and the PKK Case.....	1
1. The Scope of the Study.....	3
2. Terror, Crime and Drug Trafficking.....	4
3. Global Terrorism and Drug Trafficking.....	7
4. PKK and Turkey as a hub for drug trade .....	9
5. The PKK Network and Narcotic Money .....	11

## PART II

PKK and Its Sources.....	13
1. The Economic Bases of Terrorism.....	15
2. Drug Business Circle .....	19
3. PKK'S Expertise in Drug Business .....	22
4. PKK Discovers Narcotic Money .....	27
5. Unregistered PKK Heroin .....	31

## PART III

PKK's International Drug Trafficking and Kurdish Diaspora .....	33
1. PKK's Drug Trafficking and the Kurdish Diaspora.....	35
2. Children as Drug Sellers in the PKK Narcotic Network.....	46
3. The Sputnik Operation.....	47
4. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in France .....	49
5. PKK and Drug Trafficking in the United Kingdom .....	51
6. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Germany .....	56
7. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Netherlands .....	62
8. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Italy .....	63
9. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Denmark .....	64
10. US Labels PKK as Drug Smuggling Kingpin .....	65

CONCLUSION.....	71
-----------------	----

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	77
--------------------	----

INDEX.....	89
------------	----



## Preface

This paper is an International Security study. It is not sufficient in international security to concentrate on only the consequences of terrorism, there are political, economic and criminal causes with respect to security. There are many factors that sustain terrorism. In this study, we will focus on just one of the factors of the terror-drug trafficking connection. In the context of drug trafficking we will examine the PKK example as a case study.

According to our findings, far from being only an ethnic-separatist terrorist organization targeting Turkey, the PKK has a large network in the Middle East, Central Asia, East-West Europe and North Africa regions. The PKK also has relations with many legitimate and illegitimate organizations. It would be impossible to think that an organization with such a wide network and that acts in a hierarchical structure was not involved in the drug trafficking and smuggling. There is a special relationship based on mutual benefit between international drug trafficking and the PKK which has existed for the last 35 years.

Terrorism is a form of abuse of competition between nations. Failure among the world states to provide a

consensus allows terrorist organizations to strengthen and maintain their survival. The 35-year survival of the PKK is one of the clearest proofs of this assumption. We expect that understanding the essence of the PKK's role in drug trafficking will make a useful contribution to the effective fight against international terrorism.

Prof. Dr. Sedat Laçiner & Ahmet Doğru  
Ankara 2016

## Abbreviations

<b>BJA</b>	Bundeskriminalamt / The Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany
<b>DEA</b>	Drug Enforcement Administration
<b>ed.</b>	edited by /editor
<b>eds.</b>	editors
<b>FARC</b>	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>INCSR</b>	International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
<b>KDNs</b>	Kurdish Drug Networks
<b>KDP</b>	Partiya Demokrata Kurdistanê / Kurdistan Democratic Party
<b>KPU</b>	Yekêtiy Niştîmaniy Kurdistan / Kurdistan Patriotic Union
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NCIS</b>	National Criminal Intelligence Service (UK)
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>NJ</b>	New Jersey
<b>OGD</b>	The Geopolitical Observer of Drugs
<b>p.</b>	page
<b>PA</b>	Pennsylvania, U.S.



<b>PKK</b>	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê
<b>RAF</b>	Red Army Faction
<b>SCICO</b>	Servizio Centrale InvestigativoCriminalitàOrganizzata (Italy)
<b>SOCA</b>	Serious Organized Crime Agency
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>WCO</b>	The World Customs Organization
<b>Vol.</b>	volume

## **PART I**

### **INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THE PKK CASE**



## **1. The Scope of the Study**

This study deals with drug trafficking as the main financial source of terrorism by taking the PKK as a case study. In doing this authors emphasize the use of the illicit drug trade by the PKK for fulfilling the organization's financial needs. This study is composed of three parts.

The first part dwells on terror, crime, drug trafficking, global terrorism and the PKK's case as being an important player in drug trafficking. The connection between terrorism and the drug trade are touched, and the intersection of terrorism and drug business threatening global security are studied in this part.

The second part of the study concentrates on the PKK's expertise in the drug business. It tries to draw a picture of how the PKK discovered narcotic money via introducing the ways in which it uses Turkey's lands and its human resources all the way from Iran, Iraq and Syria to Europe.

The third part deals with the PKK's drug trafficking and dealing activities in Europe with a special attention to assistance of the Kurdish Diaspora living there.

Since it is the final destination of much drug smuggling, Europe has seen many investigations by security and intelligence services. In this part, examples from France, Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Germany are given as well as discussion about how the US perceives the drug connection of the PKK. The mafia network of the PKK and the exploitation of the children in the drug business is also touched upon.

This study concludes that the PKK (The Kurdistan Worker's Party) is notably active in drug trafficking, which makes a significant contribution to its budget. The PKK's budget produced through illicit drug trafficking has been used in its campaign against Turkey.

## 2. Terror, Crime and Drug Trafficking

Terrorism and other forms of crime are inseparably linked. If terrorist organizations were to gain a foothold, crime would surely follow. Terrorists engage in many types of crimes including extortion, alien smuggling, corruption, kidnaping, robbery, document fraud, arms trafficking, blackmailing, cyber-crime, white collar crime, smuggling of contraband, money laundering and, of course, drug trafficking to fund and facilitate terrorist activities.<sup>1</sup>

---

1 For financing terrorism and drug trade connection also see: Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (ed.), *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Jörg Friedrichs, *Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and International Police Cooperation*, (London: Routledge, 2008); Frank Shanty, *The Nexus: International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011); Mark Pieth (ed.), *Financing Terrorism*, (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003); Richard Clutterbuck, *Terrorism, Drugs & Crime in Europe After 1992*, (Abingdon: Routledge Revival, 1990); Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism and Homeland Security*, (Cengage, 2014); Nitin Prasad, *The Financing of Terrorism*, (Delhi: Alpha Editions, 2016); Robert B. Charles, *Narcotics and Terrorism: Links, Logic, and Looking Forward*, (Chelsea House, 2004); Kristen E. Boon, Aziz Huq and Douglas C. Lovelace (eds.), *Narco-terrorism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

On an ideological level, the revolutionaries generally oppose the use of drugs and punish those in their ranks who violate this rule. However, in practice, guerilla and terrorist groups have utilized the production and smuggling of drugs in many cases in order to finance arms and other organizational needs.

Drug trafficking is a highly lucrative enterprise generating billions of dollars in profit that terrorist organizations can easily tap into.<sup>2</sup> Illegal drug business provides many different avenues of revenue, including the taxing of farmers and local cartels, and the provision of security for all aspects of production, trade and distribution.<sup>3</sup>

Terror organizations must finance training, infrastructure needs, equipping of their members, bribing of local officials, recruiting, and logistics. The drug business fills their needs perfectly.

The UN estimates that the international drug trade generates \$350-500 billion per year in revenue, making drugs by far the most lucrative illicit activity. According to the UN estimations, revenues from other types of illicit transnational activity, such as arms trafficking and alien smuggling, are small by comparison.<sup>4</sup>

In this framework terrorists need drug trafficking as a source of 'easy and big money'. Similarly, drug smugglers need terror organizations as a protector

---

2 Steven C. McCraw, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington DC, May 20, 2003 <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/international-drug-trafficking-and-terrorism>

3 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/drug-trafficking-and-middle-eastern-terrorist-groups-a-growing-nexus>

4 Michael Braun, *Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?*, Policy Analysis, No. 392, July 25, 2008, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/drug-trafficking-and-middle-eastern-terrorist-groups-a-growing-nexus> <accessed on 02.06.2005>

and network provider. Terror organizations, such as the PKK, have many armed people who could protect the production, transportation and distribution of illegal drugs. Sympathizers and militants of the terrorist organizations also provide a perfect network for drug transportation and distribution. Mincheva and Gurr argue that the PKK is a clear example of the interconnected nature of terrorism and transnational organized crime. They claim "due to the level of its involvement in the drug market, the PKK has become a European organized crime syndicate itself."<sup>5</sup>

Schmid calls PKK-like organizations "hybrids, half-criminal, half-political organizations". As Schmid put it, the PKK has been involved in arms smuggling and drug and refugee trafficking, and "its criminal activities blend into its political ones, with shifting emphasis depending on the exigencies of the moment".<sup>6</sup> Freedman and Levitt state that the U.S. also considers the PKK more than a conventional terrorist organization:

*"The recent U.S. designations underscore that Kongra-Gel (PKK) operates as more of a hybrid terrorist and drug-trafficking cartel than a conventional terrorist organization. The Drug Enforcement Administration's former chief of operations Michael Braun has called these types of operations "the face of twenty-first century organized crime -- and they are meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have ever faced. They represent the most significant security challenge facing governments around the world." The recent arrest and seizure on Cyprus -- for activity more representative of a criminal drug syndicate*

---

5 Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security*, (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 65.

6 Alex P. Schmid, 'The Ultimate Threat: Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction', *Global Dialogue*, Vol. 2, No. 4, Autumn 2000, <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=112>

*than a nationalist resistance organization -- reflect Kongra-Gel's (PKK's) multifaceted character."*<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Global Terrorism and Drug Trafficking

The intersection of terrorism and organized crime is a central global security concern. More than ever, rapid globalization further accelerates this connection as well as making it easier for terrorist organizations to learn from each other. It can be seen that once one organization invents an effective way to reach their goals, others quickly apply it, not being strained with any boundaries like moral values or law, as they are already illegal organizations. In that sense within the recent few decades, terrorist organizations are likely to use drug trafficking as a financial source more than ever. In the words of J. Dennis Hastert, "drug money no longer is limited to buying yachts for the kingpins, but furnishes weapons for terrorists."<sup>8</sup>

Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States (US), gives a few examples from 2003 from areas as far apart as Columbia to Afghanistan, Pakistan to Somalia. Groups such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), aka the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; al-Qaeda; Taliban; Hezbollah; Al-Ittihad al-Islami, or AIAI, Somalia's largest militant Islamic organization, are counted as either involved in the drug business systematically or having individuals involved in such business without organizational level because of their ideological basis such as in the Hezbollah case.

---

7 Freedman, Benjamin and Matthew Levitt, 'Contending with the PKK's Narco-Terrorism', *Policy Watch*, No. 1611, 8 December 2009, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/contending-with-the-pkks-narco-terrorism>

8 Robert B. Charles, *Narcotics and Terrorism*, (Chelsea House Publishers, 2004), p. 7.



The UN estimates that the annual drug traffic trade is around 400 billion US dollars in the world in 2014.<sup>9</sup> This number shows what the stakes are in this business. Terrorist organizations, being some of the ultimate forms of the organized crime, are more inclined to make profit from drug trafficking in order to survive.

In fact, United Nation's General Assembly on 9 December 1994 issued a Declaration on Measures to combat and eliminate international terrorism in which it expressed its concern "at the growing and dangerous links between terrorist groups and drug traffickers and their paramilitary gangs, which have resorted to all types of violence, thus endangering the constitutional order of states and violating basic human rights."<sup>10</sup>

There is a close connection between terrorism and transnational organized crime. UN's Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001: "Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials..."<sup>11</sup>

Therefore, reducing the inflow of resources to the terrorist organizations is a crucial element of combating terrorism strategies.<sup>12</sup> Terrorist organizations through

---

9 Remi L. Roy, *How lucrative drug trafficking finances international terrorists organizations*, <http://www.alternet.org/drugs/how-lucrative-illegal-drug-trafficking-finances-international-terrorist-organizations><accessed on 03.03.2015>

10 Report in UN Office of Legal Affairs. *International Instruments related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism*. (New York, United Nations, 2001), p.231.

11 United Nations, Security Council. Resolution 1373 (2001), para.4; S/RES/1373 (2001).

12 McCulloch, Jude, and Sharon Pickering, *Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: Proliferating State Crime, Eroding Censure and Extending Neocolonialism*. (British Journal of Criminology 45: 470–486, 2005)

means of organized crime gain great incomes to compensate for their attack against target states. United Nations (UN) introduced the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999. It noted, "the financing of terrorism is a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole..." as well as, "the number and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may obtain..."<sup>13</sup> At this point it could be said to be in line with the UN report addressing the use of drug trafficking by the terrorist organizations, as it is quite important to discover their financial means and cut their survival resources.

#### **4. PKK and Turkey as a hub for drug trade<sup>14</sup>**

Victor Asal from the University of Albany made a data research analysis on 365 different terrorist organizations. His main motivation was to explore how organizational and environmental factors affect the likelihood of terrorist involvement in illicit drug trafficking. His analysis indicated that the degree of centrality within networks of terrorist organizations is the most significant factor affecting the likelihood of a terrorist group engaging in drug trafficking.<sup>15</sup> The PKK is such a terrorist organization and its network acts like a state mechanism. The PKK's well-structured organizational back-

---

13 United Nations General Assembly, (1999), *International Convention for the Suppressing of the Financing of Terrorism*, Resolution 54/109, 9 December. Available at <http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm>.

14 For PKK terrorism and its history see also: Ihsan Bal and Sedat Laçiner, *Ethnic Terrorism in Turkey and the Case of the PKK: Roots, Structure, Survival, and Ideology*, (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Sedat Lacinier, "Children of Terror: The Case of the PKK", *Review of International Law and Politics*, 6 (2010).

15 Victor Asal, *When Terrorists Go Bad: Analyzing Terrorist Organizations' Involvement in Drug Smuggling*, *International Studies Quarterly*, (2015) Number 59, 112-123, p. 113

bone allows it to establish a drug trafficking network to finance its budget. According to the British National Criminal Intelligence Service, in 1993 the PKK earned 44 percent of its budget from the illicit drug trade.<sup>16</sup>

Similarly, Dean C. Alexander explains that the PKK used illegal drug sales as its principal source of funding.<sup>17</sup> Senior lecturer Nick Ridley from the London Metropolitan University also confirms that drug trafficking has always been one of the most significant criminal activities of the PKK.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, some claim that Turkey is one of the transit countries of drug trafficking and therefore she is not a consumer country; so the fight against narcotics should not be one of the main concerns of Turkey. Even so, within some conversations, it is possible to encounter certain arguments claiming that narcotic money has an additional value for Turkey.

Data on drug usage verifies the fact that Turkey is not a crucial drug consumption market; it is mostly a transit country. Due to drug smuggling, billions of dollars have entered the country. However, this is not the entire picture. To categorize Turkey solely as a “transit country” is not sufficient. It must be noted that in the meantime, Turkey has emerged to become one of the crucial narcotic centers of the world.<sup>19</sup> As each drug bag passes through Istanbul or other Turkish cities to reach Western Europe it returns as terror, organized crime,

---

16 Lyubov Grigorova, Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime – Terror Alliances*, *Ibid.*, p.64

17 Dean C. Alexander, *Business Confronts Terrorism, Risks and Responses*, (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 59.

18 Nick Ridley, *Terrorist Financing: The Failure of Counter Measures*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), p. 140.

19 Turkey itself criminalized more than 130,000 people for drug offences in 2012 alone: ‘Turkey’s War on Drugs’, *Dirog Reporter*, 6 October 2014, <http://drogriporter.hu/node/2612>

street violence and loss of governmental authority in Turkey.

Besides, this process has been going on for decades; the drug-violence-degeneration triangle has insidiously raised prejudice against Turkey internally. It is important that drug trucks that pass from Turkey should be stopped so as to re-construct order in Turkey and, more importantly, to re-gain government authority. In this study, we will focus on the connection between PKK terrorism and drug smuggling. Although certain renowned sources of Turkish, European and American descent and other media reports reveal that PKK members control the European drug cartel and that they even used children to sell drugs, the connection is not a well-studied one.

## 5. The PKK Network and Narcotic Money

When all these data are considered, it is not extreme to say that the PKK has created a symbiotic relationship with its existence and drug business. Lieutenant General Ergin Saygun, deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, recently estimated that 50 to 60 percent of the PKK's annual revenues are derived from drug trafficking. As *The Spectator*, a British weekly magazine, puts it, "the PKK has financed its war against Turkey by extortion and the sale of heroin."<sup>20</sup>

In the meantime, a new kind of mafia has emerged in drug, smuggling, and tribute\robbery areas. This formation, to be called the 'PKK mafia', has developed its own mentality beyond the terrorist organization's classic mentality. In the course of time, participation in the network from outside has begun and a network

---

20 *The Spectator*, 28 November-5 December 1998.

stretching to three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa) has been created. Surprisingly, some organizations defining themselves contrary to the PKK have also begun participating in this PKK mafia network. Thus, the drug money is undermining public order and state authority in the country, Turkish or Kurdish ideologies curtailing the real intentions. So in order to secure processing, transportation, distribution and market drug production, this network has reflected itself differently and has even spread inside the state body. The criticisms made by European countries in the mid-1990s concerned the fact that drug bosses had acquaintances in the Turkish cabinets. Although these claims seem to be exaggerated, it is remarkable that organizations presenting themselves to the public under a different ideology and utilizing state power in some cases have been cooperating with the PKK. It can be argued that the Deep State problem, extreme nationalism and terrorism in Turkey have been financed by the drug smuggling money for many years.<sup>21</sup>

---

21 Stephen R. Barnhart, *International Terrorism and Political Violence*, (Victoria: Trafford, 2002), p. 119.

## **PART II**

### **PKK AND ITS SOURCES**



## **1. The Economic Bases of Terrorism**

Terrorist organizations are based on two main columns: The first one is an ideological/political base. Terrorist organizations are renowned for exploiting the mistakes of states and areas where state authority is deficient; it can be observed that as these organizations increase their exploitation facilities, they tend to grow faster. The second important column that terrorist organizations are based on is economic infrastructure. Money is recruited for weapons, explosive materials, daily needs of terrorists, etc. Contrary to the common perception, countries do not pay terrorist organizations in cash. When other countries want to assist the PKK, they prefer to use other “natural ways”. There are four fundamental principles which help to maintain the economic infrastructure of terrorism:

- 1) tribute\blackmailing\donation
- 2) robbery
- 3) narcotic money
- 4) other illegal revenue



According to German Intelligence agencies, the PKK's European organization entities collect millions of Euros per year through donations from its supporters under the campaign that this is a "freedom fight". The supporters of the organization are expected and forced to donate their one-month wages.<sup>22</sup>

If we move with the presumption that the world drug market is approximately worth 400-500 billion dollars, we can see that this amount is enough not only to sustain terrorist organizations but also individual countries. The money which circulates in the drug market is almost equivalent to the US annual defense expenditure.

In the words of Smith, "the PKK has long been associated with the drug trade. Since 1985, over 300 PKK members have been arrested for drug offenses, and over half of these arrests occurred in Germany."<sup>23</sup>

It is argued that PKK has at certain points in time controlled 80% of the European market which constitutes one of the main segments of the huge world market. Franck Urbancic, deputy of counterterrorism coordinator of the State Department, told CNN-TURK "The PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] is like the mafia all over Europe. The PKK has an octopus-like structure carrying out criminal activity, including drug and people smuggling to raise funds, as well as fronts that provide cover to the organization's criminal and terror activities."<sup>24</sup>

---

22 Philip Wittrock, *Kurdish Propaganda and Patriotism: How the PKK Operates in Europe*, Spiegel Online International, July 11, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,565298,00.html> <accessed on 03.01.2016>

23 Paul J. Smith, 'Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to Terrorism Money Trail', in James J. F. Forest (ed.), *Essentials of Counterterrorism*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015), pp. 105-128, p. 111.

24 CNN-TURK News, PKK ahtapot gibi Avrupa'nın her yerinde, February 13, 2008, <http://www.cnntrk.com/2008/turkiye/02/13/pkk.ah tapot.gibi.avrupanin.her.yerinde/428046.0/index.html> <accessed on 03.03.2016>; Oscar Palma, 'Criminal Interests within Political Insurgencies: The Case for Development-Centred Counterinsurgency' in Fred Cante

The PKK's organizational structure helps to clarify how the PKK has been able to sustain itself for more than two decades. Michael Radu asserts that "Considering the range of PKK drug trafficking in Europe (Germany, France, Denmark, Romania, Switzerland, Belgium and Netherlands), the group is wealthy indeed".<sup>25</sup> Radu further argues that the PKK's annual income from drug trafficking, robberies, extortion, emigrant and arms smuggling reached ten millions of dollars in the 1990s. CNN International further confirms Mr. Radu's claim by drawing attention to the organized crime and drug smuggling affairs of the PKK with the following statement: "By many accounts from inside and outside Turkey, Ocalan is a dogmatic and tyrannical leader whose organization is involved in drug trafficking, robbery, extortion, arson, blackmail and money laundering."<sup>26</sup>

Likewise Phillips<sup>27</sup>, Clarkson<sup>28</sup> and Pek<sup>29</sup> argue that PKK financed its operations through drug and arms

---

and Hartmut Quehl (eds.), *Handbook of Research on Transitional Justice and Peace Building in Turbulent Regions*, (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2016), pp. 421-444, p. 427.

- 25 Michael Radu, 'Terrorism is Free Speech', 2004, <http://www.tetedeturc.com/home/spip.php?article659>, <accessed on 04.07.2016> published also in Front Page Magazine,
- 26 Beat Witschi, 'Who is Abdullah Ocalan?', 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/05/12/ocalan.profile/> <accessed on 07.04.2016>, Story was originally written for CNN.com in 1999 as part of the coverage of the trial of Abdullah Ocalan.
- 27 David L. Phillips, 'The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East', (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015), p. 32. Also see: Paige Whaley Eager, *From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and Political Violence*, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), p. 175; Ed Wise and Jennifer Lang, 'Counterterrorism in Turkey: Implications of the Syrian Crisis for Jihadist and Kurdish Terrorism', in Kenan Aksu (ed.), *Turkey: A Regional Power in the Making*, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 17-40, p. 19.
- 28 Wensley Clarkson, *Hash: The Secret and Chilling Story Behind of the Drug's Deadly Underworld*, (London: Quercus Editions Ltd., 2013).
- 29 'PKK'nın En Büyük Geliri Uyuşturucu' (*The PKK's Biggest Fund Source is Drug*), NTV, 22 October 2009, <http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/pkknin-en-buyuk-geliri-uyusturucu,6QUyim-kQ0euNv77ghFAKQ>

smuggling, human trafficking, and extortion. Turkish press reports state that the PKK produces at least 60 tons of heroin per year and receives an estimated income of 40-55 million dollars each year from drug trafficking proceeds.<sup>30</sup> According to an Associated Press story, the PKK derives as much as \$500 million annually from illegal activities including the drug trade. The income from taxation of other traffickers passing through their controlled territories is unknown.<sup>31</sup> In 2015 Cengiz Erisir, President of the TUBIM (Turkey Drug and Drug Addicting Observing Centre) estimated that the PKK's annual revenue from drug trade is 1-3 billion dollars.<sup>32</sup>

Although most of the heroin is destined for the European market, some is smuggled into the United States. It has been noted that in 2008 alone, the drug income of the PKK had reached more than 500 million euros. According to Soner Cagaptay, the figure is actually much higher than 500 million euros. Cagaptay claims that approximately 2.5 billion narcotic dollars go to the PKK.<sup>33</sup>

30 Document No. 6 Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism – A Dangerous Mix – Statement of Steven W. Casteel, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 20 2003, in Kristen E. Boon, Aziz Huq and Douglas C. Lovelace (eds.), *Narco-terrorism*, Commentary on Security Documents, Vol. 105, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 147.

31 Turkey Today, Nos. 155-159, Turkey's Embassy in Washington, 1996,

32 Lütfi Erdoğan, 'PKK'nın Uyuşturucu Trafiği Deşifre Edildi', (*PKK's Drug Trafficking Deciphered*), *Habertürk* (daily), 28 August 2015; 'PKK, Çocuklara Uyuşturucu Satarak Silah Alıyor' (PKK Buys Weapons by Selling Drug to Children), *Sabah* (daily), 27 August 2015. Australia's News.com news site claims that the PKK is still in dependent on the drug money: "It gets most of its money from drug trafficking, which can generate hundreds of millions of US dollars. it also generates income from extortion, illegal immigration, human trafficking, money laundering and prostitution rackets. 'Taxes' are collected, either voluntarily or by coercion, from Kurdish diaspora communities from around the world": "Australia may be arming PKK or Kurdistan Workers Party", *News.com.au*, 16 September 2014, <http://www.news.com.au/world/australia-may-be-arming-pkk-or-kurdistan-workers-party/news-story/a4ee2d86b3555d394f3f57cb1956378f>

33 Cited in Mark Galeotti, 'Turkish Organised Crime: From Tradition to

Through these facts, it becomes obvious that the PKK has been financing its activities through illegal means and drug trafficking has constituted a large share of this budget.<sup>34</sup>

## 2. Drug Business Circle


A higher amount of production area indicates a higher number of terrorist activities. In Afghanistan, which is the main opium cultivation center, 209000-hectare land was allocated for opium production. When this number expands, seemingly both terrorist attacks and seizure of drugs by police forces increases. As another example, in 2013 Turkey witnessed the highest number of events and seizure of suspects due to drug trafficking as is shown in Figure 1. The components of the chain of drug production, trade and usage are prerequisites of each other.

---

Business', in Dina Siegel and Henk van de Bunt (eds.), *Traditional Organized Crime in the Modern World: Responses to Socioeconomic Change*, (New York: Springer, 2012), pp. 49-66, p. 57.

34 Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime – Terror Alliances and the State*, Ibid, p. 64.

Figure 1: Drug Cultivation-Trade-Usage Circle




When the terrorist organizations discovered that they can make easy money via drug trafficking, the resulting increase in the drug trade boosted the number of drug users as well. UNODC estimated that in 1990 there were 180 million total drug users. This number increased to 272 million in 2010.<sup>35</sup> This statistic tells us that there are approximately 10% increases per year in the potential consumer market for the illicit drug trade. The relationship between the drug trade and terrorism determines the range of terrorist activities'. James Pizazza states that "Increased demand in the longer term buoys illicit drug prices and maintains higher revenue streams for all actors engaged in the drug trade, including terrorist movements. This stands to provide terror-

35 UNODC *World Drug Report* in 2010.

ist movements with the resources necessary to continue activities and to increase attacks, provided that the increase in costs is less than the increase in revenue from the increased cultivation. Perhaps more importantly, increased drug production boosts attacks as a byproduct of the locations where terrorist groups engage in the illicit drug industry.”<sup>36</sup>

Growing amount of cultivation areas in the “Golden Crescent” coincides with ascending numbers of deaths, deteriorating conditions for younger people in favor of using drugs at younger ages and increased seizure of drugs by security officers in Turkey. Moreover, an increasing supply of different kinds of drugs ignites terrorist organizations and crime groups to benefit more from their drug business. The Cultivation-Trade-Usage circle helps terrorist organizations to gain expertise in the drug business.


Figure 2: Opium Production Area in Afghanistan (Hectare)<sup>37</sup>



36 UNODC Background Guide, James Piazza, *Narcoterrorism – The Financial Backbone of Terrorist Organizations*, THSMUN, 2015 p.6, Also see, James Piazza, ‘The illicit drug trade, counternarcotic strategies and terrorism’, Public Choice, Vol. 149, No. 3/4,, The Many Faces of Counterterrorism, December 2011.

37 UNODC, *World Drug Report*, 2014.

Figure 3: Number of Events and Suspects<sup>38</sup>



Figures 2 and 3 indicate that an increase in kinds of drug cultivation coincided with increasing drug seizure events and suspected traffickers. The number of events in Turkey was at its highest level where production area grew the most in Afghanistan.

### 3. PKK'S Expertise in Drug Business

Research and investigations conducted by security institutions demonstrated that the PKK has been involved in all levels of illicit drug business. This drug business includes both cultivation/production of cannabis, acetic anhydride, synthetic drugs, morphine base, opium, hashish, and heroin, and their transfer from production to the consumption area. Drug trafficking business requires a multi-layered and well-established orga-

38 European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Report, 2014.

nizational structure. It is multi-layered in the sense that terrorist organizations should surpass impediments such as cultivation, production, trafficking and marketing procedures. Gretchen Peters argues that the PKK got its start by taxing traffickers who passed through its control zones. For Peters, PKK's role in drug trafficking has deepened over time.<sup>39</sup>

Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, confessed in 1999 that all drug traders in the southeast region paid the PKK. Abdullah Ocalan said that "Osman Ocalan (code name Ferhat) was responsible person in the name of the PKK for taxing all smugglers in the region."<sup>40</sup> However, Öcalan did not accept a direct role in drug trafficking but taxation of the drug money.

According to Victor Asal's research conducted on the motivations and instruments which involve terrorist organizations in the drug trade, "the degree of centrality within networks of terrorist organizations is the most significant factor affecting the likelihood of a terrorist group engaging in drug trafficking."<sup>41</sup> The PKK is such a terrorist organization that has deep knowledge of members and the activities of the drug networks. The PKK and major drug traffickers coexisted in the same project.<sup>42</sup> With its huge networks starting from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey to Western Europe, the PKK establishes and manages its drug trafficking business via a state-like organizational structure. Therefore, its hierarchical structure paves the way for drug smuggling and trafficking as a source of income.

39 Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan War*, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), p. 10.

40 Uğur Dündar, 'PKK-Uyuşturucu Bağlantısı' (PKK-Drug Connection), *Hürriyet*, 13 March 1999.

41 Victor Asal, *Ibid*, p.113.

42 Behsat Ekici, 'International Drug Trafficking and National Security of Turkey', *Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2014. p. 116



The PKK's human resource needs are continuously enlarging due to the expanding drug trafficking network.<sup>43</sup> The PKK had made use of its Kurdish Diaspora networks to add some new recruits to be used in drug dealing activities. Increasing need for new recruits required financial source to compensate for their wages. Haydar Karaman explains this as follow: "In most cases, these groups [like the PKK] do not engage in drugs during the initial stage of their combat. However, due to an increasing number of cadres and operations, during the enlargement stage, this necessity compels them to get involved in drug trafficking. Their success in terms of enlargement is related to the funding demands of the organization."<sup>44</sup>

In the beginning, the PKK's entry into the drug trade was mainly limited to taxation and extortion of drug traffickers from the Iranian border to Turkish lands. The PKK's good knowledge of the region of Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian borders provided it with a chance to guard the drug trafficking passage routes. This guardianship role made the PKK one of the most significant partners of organized crime groups. Kurdish Drug Networks (KDNs) that are acting on profit maximization bases via drug trafficking developed a bilateral relationship with the PKK. The PKK and KDNs' goals intersected particularly in the post-Cold War period; the PKK began to suffer a budgetary crisis as a result of shrinking financial assistance from its Marxist patrons.<sup>45</sup>

---

43 Haydar Karaman, *'Terrorism and Its Financial Sources'*, Strategic Outlook, December 2012, [http://www.strategicoutlook.org/publications/Terrorism\\_and\\_Its\\_Financial\\_Sources.pdf](http://www.strategicoutlook.org/publications/Terrorism_and_Its_Financial_Sources.pdf), <Accessed on 07.04.2016> p. 7-8

44 Haydar Karaman, *'Terrorism and Its Financial Sources'*, p. 9

45 Behsat Ekici, Phil Williams, Ayhan Akbulut, 'The PKK and the KDNs: cooperation, convergence or Conflict?' Strozier, Charles and Frank James, (Eds) *The PKK: financial sources, social and political dimensions*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Publications, 2012.; Ahmet Pek ve Behsat

The PKK's tax income does not only include the Turkish-Iranian border. It enlarged its tax income in Western Europe over the street dealers of Kurdish crime groups. Focus Magazine reported on September 7<sup>th</sup> of 1999 that Hamburg and Hannover police forces organized an operation against the PKK-connected heroin distribution networks. German police reported that the PKK has earned 1 Million DM from the taxes taken from heroin distribution.<sup>46</sup>

The PKK is also active in the cannabis cultivation business in the Southeastern part of Turkey. Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkari were the PKK's important centers for cannabis cultivation. According to the security and intelligence institutions' estimation, the PKK annually produces nearly 400 million USD from cannabis cultivation.<sup>47</sup> Operations conducted against the PKK in Turkey were carried out to detect and destroy the production fields. In 2012, Turkish Police and Gendarme forces seized 3 million cannabis plants and a ton of cannabis resin. The cannabis cultivation business incontrovertibly contributes to the PKK's annual budget. In order to secure the production and cultivation procedure, the PKK uses its armed units to create a security deficit in order to open up safe zones for cannabis cultivation.<sup>48</sup>

---

Ekici, *Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of PKK-KONGRA GEL From Illicit Drug Business*, Ozgur Nikbay ve Suleyman Hangerli (Eds) *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective*, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, 2007, p. 13.

46 Focus Magazine, *PKK Mit Drogengeld den Terror finanziert*, July 19, 1999 [http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/pkk-mit-drogengeld-den-terror-finanziert\\_aid\\_180106.html](http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/pkk-mit-drogengeld-den-terror-finanziert_aid_180106.html) <accessed on 03.13.2016>

47 Cihat Arpacik, *PKK'nın Vazgeçemediği 1 Milyar Liralık Esrar*, Yeni Şafak Daily, July 7, 2013, <http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/pkknin-vazgecemedigi-1-milyar-liralik-esrar-536972?p=1> <accessed on 03.03.2016>

48 Timur Göksel, *Demonstrations in Lice, Turkey Linked to Cannabis Harvest*, Al-Monitor, June 12, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/turkey-lice-diyarbakir-protests-cannabis-harvest.html>, <accessed on 03.03.2016>

For instance, as a center of cannabis cultivation, the Lice district of Diyarbakır became the most valuable place for the PKK once the advantage of a security vacuum enabled it to produce and transport cannabis freely. The PKK takes all risks for cannabis cultivation because it produces enormous amounts of money for the PKK's annual budget.

The PKK diversified its revenue sources after 1990s. It enjoyed more income from the production of synthetic drugs in addition to taxing drug traffickers and cannabis cultivation.<sup>49</sup> The Turkish National Police investigations concerning the PKK's drug trafficking and cultivation, there were cases wherein cocaine, amphetamines and chemicals were used to manufacture drugs.<sup>50</sup> Overall, security forces in 1997 seized about 10,000 kilograms of hashish, 3,500 kilograms of heroin and large amounts of synthetic drugs such as captagon and ecstasy.<sup>51</sup> According to Turkey's Department of Anti-smuggling and Organized Crime report, seizures of synthetic drugs after 2000 on a global scale increased six-fold when compared with 1990s.<sup>52</sup> Synthetic drugs gained importance particularly due to the global drug demands. Synthetic drugs are not bound to certain climate and environment conditions. In fact, laboratory conditions, located anywhere, are sufficient to produce synthetic drugs. The

49 Ahmet Pek and Behsat Ekici, 'Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of the PKK-KONGRA GEL from Illicit Drug Business' in Ozgur Nikbay and Suleyman Hancerli (eds.), *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon*, IOS Press, 2007, pp. 140-153, p. 146

50 Michael Freeman, 'Introduction to Financing Terrorism: Case Studies', in (eds.) Michael Freeman, *Financing Terrorism, Case Studies*, (England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012) p.29

51 Hurriyet Daily News, Police: PKK funds terrorism through drug trade, April 4, 1998, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-pkk-funds-terrorism-through-drug-trade.aspx?pageID=438&n=polic-pkk-funds-terrorism-through-drug-trade-1998-04-04><accessed on 03.25.2016>

52 Turkey's Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime 2004 *Report*, 2004, p. 22

PKK discovered the easy ways to produce more heroin and other acetic anhydride and synthetic drugs, which are more profitable.

#### 4. PKK Discovers Narcotic Money

When the PKK emerged as a terrorist organization, it did not take it very long to discover the benefits of drug smuggling. From the beginning of the 1980s, it has become active in both production and transportation sectors of the illegal drug business. As Nachmani put it, the PKK controlled much of the drug trade to and from Turkey, the Bqa'a Valley, and the 'Safe Haven' in northern Iraq between 1984 and 1999. In these years the Turkish Army, while fighting the PKK, seized 13,363 kilos of hashish, 4,255 kilos of morphine, 2,502 kilos of heroin and 621 grams of cocaine.<sup>53</sup>

Sami Abdurrahman, from the Kurdistan Democratic Party, argues that Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, has been involved in drug trafficking from the day the PKK was established.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, Moyara Ruehsen also says "the PKK has been involved drug trafficking since its beginning."<sup>55</sup>

In the year 1982, the PKK began to produce hemp and opium poppy in Lebanese camps (Baelbek and Hermen) that were under Syrian control. The ports of Beirut, Sayda, Sur, Miryan, Abdeh and Tripoli were the main transit points of these transactions. Drugs were

53 *Arabies Trends*, January 2001 and *Turkish Daily News*, 12 March 1999, both mentioned in Amikam Nachmani, *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 199.

54 Hussein Tahiri, *Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State*, (Mazda Publishers, 2007), p. 287.

55 Moyara Ruehsen, 'Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK)', in Michael Freeman (ed.), *Financing Terrorism: Case Studies*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).

sent to ports in Greek Cyprus, Greece and Italy; and through this venue the terrorist organization has been able to sustain a significant amount of revenue for many years. It is unfortunate that Syria, Greek Cyprus and Greece ignored (or supported) the PKK drug business in order to support the terrorist organization against Turkey.

In the beginning of the 1980s, the PKK became active in the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran line which then crosses Turkey and reaches Europe. These three countries are commonly known as the “golden crescent” for drug smuggling.<sup>56</sup> In addition to the ‘Golden Crescent’, Laos – Thailand – Birmania countries are the ‘Golden Triangle’ and these three are also known as centers of drug production and smuggling in the continent Asia.

In other words, Turkey is strategically located between the lush poppy fields of Central Asia, East Asia and the vast market of Europe.<sup>57</sup> The main producer countries and main users are located around Turkey. Thus, Turkey is one of the main routes for the European drug market. A significant study by a research team of the US Library of Congress has indeed suggested identifying ten factors making a nation “hospitable” to transnational crime and terrorism. That study states that countries which are located along arms or narcotic trafficking routes are much more hospitable to drug trafficking and terrorism.<sup>58</sup> It can be observed that it certainly did not take too long for the PKK militants to realize the importance of their ‘lucky position’ in terms

---

56 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, *The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), p. 44.

57 David R. Simon, *Tony Soprano's America: The Criminal Side of the American Dream*, (Westview Press, 2002), p. 71.

58 La Verle Berry et al. Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism. Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, 2003, p. 1.

of controlling drug trafficking between the East and the West. Terrorists became aware of the huge wealth involved in this business and began their interactions by allowing transitions and sustaining “security services” for ordinary smugglers. In this context, the PKK terrorist organization is not an exception and it “taxed” those who smuggled drugs, arms, and other valuable goods in the 1980s and 1990s. In the words of Barkey and Fuller ‘taxation extended to all kinds of economic activities within the southeast - especially narcotics’.<sup>59</sup>

During the 1980s, it was certainly not difficult for the PKK to conduct international drug transportation in the region as it was organized almost in every district and village of eastern Turkey. Turkey expert Nachmani says the PKK controlled 30-40 percent of the heroin traffic from Afghanistan, Iran and Lebanon, which passes through Turkey on its way to Europe.<sup>60</sup>

At the end of the 1980s, the organization came to realize that the real money was in the drug processing business. When raw drug materials are processed, their prices increase exponentially. At that point the PKK began to construct processing drug laboratories initially in East and Southeast Anatolia and later in different regions of Turkey and in some Eastern European countries.

When its infrastructure and organizational schema became sophisticated in Istanbul, drug dispatching and distribution became easier for the PKK in the European market. Especially, on the Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey-Eastern Europe-Southern Europe-West Europe route,

---

59 Henri J. Barkey and Graham Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Problem*, (Oxford: Carnegie, 1998), p. 31.

60 Amikam Nachmani, *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 35.

tons of morphine, heroin, liquid hashish and other drug materials were transferred under PKK control. Moreover, increasing instability in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Iran-Iraq-Turkey-Western Europe route became more popular for drug smuggling. As Michael Rubin pointed out, different from the KDP and the KPU, the PKK still facilitates drug smuggling from Iran through Iraq and Turkey and into Europe.<sup>61</sup>

With regard to the PKK's relations with Kurdish crime groups, the PKK followed two ways in which it exploited the drug trade. The first is that the PKK established a 'watchdog' custom check structure at the Turkish-Iranian border, which is mostly used for heroin trafficking. The second is that the PKK helped the Kurdish crime groups to survive in return for a so-called "patriotic tax". In an interview with the brother of Osman Ocalan, he stated that the PKK is active in drug trafficking particularly at custom points, and the PKK was taking "tax" payment. The PKK's tax income does not only include Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Iraqi borders. It enlarged its tax income in Western Europe over the street dealers of Kurdish crime groups.

David Kenner, the Middle East editor for *Foreign Policy* journal, the success of the Turkish State in combatting PKK terrorism forced the PKK to turn to the drug trade to finance itself.<sup>62</sup>

According to Phil Williams, when the PKK built up its own competence and created drug-trafficking substructures, it sought to replace Kurdish criminal networks in Western Europe and this sparked a series

---

61 Andrew Mango, *Turkey on the War on Terror* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 49.

62 David Kenner, 'Turkey's War Within', *Foreign Policy*, 17 August 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/17/turkeys-war-within-kurds-election-erdogan-pkk/>

of turf wars in drug markets in Europe that the PKK mostly won.<sup>63</sup>

The PKK has not only played a significant role in drug transportation in the East-West route, but also in the West-East route for the transportation of chemical goods used for processing the raw drug materials in the East.

According to the TUBIM report of 2013, Turkish security agencies seized 26 tons of acetic anhydride from PKK members.<sup>64</sup> Some research and analysis papers underlined that 50-80% of heroin supplies to Europe is handled by the PKK or PKK-linked groups.<sup>65</sup> The United Nations' report on World Drug Report revealed that the PKK had gained enormous amount of income from controlling drug trafficking.

### 5. Unregistered PKK Heroin<sup>66</sup>

It is really difficult to understand the volume of heroin smuggling carried out by the PKK. Most of the heroin trade in Turkey and in Europe seems to be made under different names but a significant portion of the revenue goes to the terrorist organization. It is a well-known fact that during the 1990s, important parts of the PKK heroin were traded by the secret 'deep state'-linked groups.

According to the Paris-based OGD (The Geopolitical Observer of Drugs), the hundreds of tons of heroin

63 Phil Williams, 'Terrorist Financing', in Paul Shemella (ed.), *Fighting Back, What Governments can do about Terrorism*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

64 TUBIM, *National Drug Report 2013*. (Ankara: Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Publications, 2013).

65 UNODC. (2012). *World Drug Report*. Vienna: United Nations Publications; Mincheva and Gurr, *Crime-Terror*, p. 64.

66 Mehtap Soyler, *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (New York: Routledge, 2015).



captured in the operations against the PKK were not registered and were traded by ultra-Turkish nationalist organizations, gangs and so-called deep-state fractions.

The ODG 1997 Report says more than 1.000 kilos of heroin captured from the PKK militants remained unregistered each month during the 1990s period.<sup>67</sup> It is really difficult to estimate the volume of the unregistered or underground drug trade made by the so-called deep-state. However some authors in Turkey have claimed that the unregistered drug trade had been funding big deep-state operations in Turkey. The co-operation between terror organizations and some secret groups inside the state has also been a popular debate among Turkish experts.

---

67 Nadire Mater, *Voices from the Front: Turkish Soldiers on the War with the Kurdish Guerrillas*, (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 315.

### **PART III**

## **PKK'S INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING AND KURDISH DIASPORA**



## 1. PKK's Drug Trafficking and the Kurdish Diaspora

The history of the Kurdish organized crime network has long been dominated by kinship ties. However, when they were in need of well-structured organizational order, they set aside the kinship ties principle.<sup>68</sup> Adapting new recruits to the organization was an immediate need. Turkish security consultant Ali Koknar noted in the Summer 1997 issue of Counter- terrorism and Security International that the relationships between the PKK, old Kurdish clans and criminal organizations are imbricated and difficult to discern one from another.<sup>69</sup> Several of these clans or big tribal families (*aşiret*) had a history of rebellion against Turkey.

The most popular family was the Baybasin family in Europe, particularly with regard to drug business. Abdullah Baybasin and his brother, Huseyin Bayba-

---

68 Mark Galeotti, 'Turkish Organized Crime: From Tradition to Organized Crime', in Dina Siegel and Henk Van de Bunt (Eds.), *Traditional Organized Crime in the Modern World: Responses to Socioeconomic Change*, Springer, Newyork 2012, p. 51.

69 Ali Koknar, *Counter-Terrorism and International Security* 1998.

sin, (convicted of drug trafficking in the Netherlands and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2002) were the patrons of organized crime in Europe. They became specialized in the drug trafficking business. After they explored drug money, they opened up their networks for people recruited from Kurdish diaspora. They are organized to maximize their profit in accordance with the needs of the drug business rather than preserving and reflecting their personal loyalties, kinship ties or other sentimental factors.<sup>70</sup>

The PKK is a multilevel terrorist organization in which its income does not only derivate from the drug business but also from blackmailing, bribery, robbery and donations from the Kurdish diaspora. However, the lion's share of the annual income of the PKK comes from drug-related business. Frank Cilluffo testified before the US House of Representatives that the PKK has financed their separatist movement by engaging in the drug business. He claimed that it was heavily involved in European drug trade particularly in Germany and France.<sup>71</sup> According to French law enforcement, 80 percent of the heroin in Paris is brought in by the PKK.<sup>72</sup> The German Daily NRZ reported that the PKK was organizing the narcotic trades of Hamburg, Essen, Bremen, and Frankfurt in Germany.<sup>73</sup> There is no specific data showing the exact number of the PKK's share in the overall drug business activity even in UN reports.

70 Mark Galeotti, *Ibid*, p. 52

71 Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethno nationalist and Islamist challenges to regional security*, *Ibid*, p. 64.

72 Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress Second Session, December 13, 2000, Serial No. 148 p. 30.

73 German *Daily NRZ*, March 30, 1993.

However, the total percentage of all European drug business attributed to the PKK varies from 40 percent to 80 percent.<sup>74</sup>

Italian Daily *Il Giornale* reported that the director of the Italian Police Force's Central Operations Service, Alessandro Pansa, issued a report, 'New Guide to Fighting Money Laundering,' on the issue to the Italian Bankers Association in December, 1998. He mentioned in his report that the PKK is the main group behind the heroin trade. Heroin from Anatolia [the Turkish peninsula] has now become the main product on the market.<sup>75</sup> A 1998 report by the Italian Financial Police, SCICO, came up with similar estimates, *Il Giornale* reported. The police agency determined that the PKK is "directly involved" in "international drug-trafficking."

In the early years of its activities in Europe, the PKK's and the Kurdish diaspora's motives were primarily shaped by the objective of creating awareness and recognition of their ethnic cause in the European media and political circles.<sup>76</sup> The Kurdish diaspora's other remarkable motivation was to have the ability to mobilize its recruits across the Europe and to add some new comers by requesting shelter from German authorities. Therefore, the PKK's bid for an ethnic nationalistic fight should have been marketed on the basis of visibility and attention in the European media and political circles. This bid required financial sources. Thanks to drug trafficking and trading opportunities and the PKK's growing influence, the way was paved for its money making facilities.

---

74 Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethno nationalist and Islamist challenges to regional security*, *Ibid*, p. 64.

75 Joseph Brewda, "PKK Heroin Cartel Threatens Europe", *EIR*, Vol. 26, No. 6, Feb. 5, 1999, December 15, Daily *Il Giornale*,

76 Bahar Baser, *Diaspora Politics and Germany's Kurdish Question*, December 6, 2013 p. 7

In the words of David Romano “once the PKK matured into a larger, more established movement, it could finance itself via contributions from Kurds in the region and abroad as well as with support from foreign state powers and involvement in the narcotics trade and smuggling”.<sup>77</sup> The PKK reached one of its main political aims when it constructed a Kurdish Diaspora composed of PKK sympathizers in Western European countries. It became one of the real bosses in the drug business between the Golden Crescent and Western Europe without any serious rivals.

Turkey has been an important hub along the heroin route between Afghanistan and Europe<sup>78</sup>, and the PKK has always been one of the most significant actors in illegal drug business on this way.

The PKK has used three main routes (the Mediterranean, the Balkans and north-eastern European routes) as transit destinations for trafficking heroin to Western Europe. In the words of Stephen Barnhart, “Turkey’s position astride the ‘Balkan route’ makes it a significant transit point for narcotics:

*“Using this route, the PKK smuggles morphine base and heroin from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan into Turkey across Turkey’s eastern borders. Since the late-1980s, the terrorist organization has, instead of trafficking externally produced heroin, and opted for a more profitable way of producing heroin from non-heroin opiates. To this end, the PKK refines base morphine into heroin in mobile laboratories near Istanbul and in southeastern parts of Anatolia. The PKK also cultivates opium and cannabis in Bekaa*

77 David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 91.

78 Ayhan Bakar, *Justice and Home Affairs: Impact of the European Union on the Internal Security of Turkey*, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), p. 58.

*Valley (Lebanon) and in the isolated regions of southern Anatolia and Northern Iraq". Narcotics smuggling therefore constitutes a major part of the PKK's financial apparatus, alongside extortion, blackmailing, robbery, arms smuggling and illicit labor trafficking. The PKK is actively involved in all phases of narcotics trafficking, from the producing and processing of the drugs to their smuggling and marketing. The revenues gained from illicit drug dealings on marketing are channeled to funding its arms purchases, which is required to sustain its terrorist activities. PKK's involvement in narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities are thus well documented in classified sources."*<sup>79</sup>

In the Mediterranean Sea route, the PKK sent heroin directly to Italy, France and Spain. Cyprus and Greece was also used as transit stops.

On the Balkan route, the PKK makes co-operations with the Bulgarian mafia and other crime groups. PKK militants are actively involved in the drug business in Bulgaria. According to the World Customs Organization (WCO) figures below 27 percent of all arrested heroin traffickers in Bulgaria between 2000-2008 were Turkish/Kurdish.<sup>80</sup> As it is shown in Table 1, drug trafficking along the Balkan route is systematic and appears to involve well-structured terrorist and organized crime groups.

79 Stephen R. Barnhart, *The New International Terrorism and Political Violence Guide*, (Victoria, B.C.: Trafford, 2002), p. 120.


80 World Customs Organization (WCO) *Reports on Heroin*, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/5.Heroin.pdf> <accessed on 7.4.2016> p. 123.



Figure 4: Drug Trafficking Routes



Distribution of Arrested Heroin Traffickers By Nationality in Bulgaria, 2000-2008



Source: World Custom Organization

The PKK's north-eastern European route or the Black Sea drug route consists of Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and Germany. The PKK sometimes uses Slovakia and Czech Republic as a way to Germany as well.

McCoy claims that the PKK also used Caucasus in its drug trafficking. According to McCoy, the PKK manufactured heroin in the Caucasus countries and had close co-operation with the local militant groups.<sup>81</sup>

81 Alfred W. McCoy, 'The Stimulus of Prohibition', in Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs and Kent Mathewson (eds.), *Dangerous Harvest*:

As Solinge put it, the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s changed the face of heroin trafficking in Europe: "Until the war broke out, most heroin on the Balkan route was passing through (former) Yugoslavia. The war resulted in a diversification of the trafficking routes, both in northern and in southern directions. For example, heroin was increasingly being transported from Greece to Italy, from where it could reach the markets."<sup>82</sup>

*Table 1: Distribution of Heroin Flows To Europe*<sup>83</sup>

Route	Size of Flows (tons)	Per Cent
Balkan route – (Afghanistan- Iran-Turkey-Southern Europe)	85	80%
Northern Route– Afghanistan–C. Asia–RF–E. Europe)	4	4%
Northern Balkan Route – (Afghanistan - Iran - Caucasus - S. Europe)	7	7%
Directly from Pakistan to Western and Central Europe	5	5%
Through Africa to Western and Central Europe	2	2%
Directly from South and SE Asia (except India) to W&C Europe	1	1%
Through Middle East and Gulf area to W&C Europe	1	1%
Directly from India to W&C Europe	1	1%

---

*Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 77.

82 Tim Boekhout van Solinge, 'Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Europe, *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 1998, 1: pp. 100-105, <http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/boekhout.drug.html>

83 UNODC Heroin Report, p. 122.

According to the United Nations reports the PKK taxes the other traffickers too. To the NATO intelligence analysts, the PKK pockets upwards of US\$50 million to US\$100 million annually from heroin trafficking alone. The United Nations estimates that the annual net profit organized crime groups, including the PKK, make managing heroin trafficking between Iran and Turkey and further to the Turkey/Bulgaria and/or Turkey/Greece borders is around US\$8.000 per kg, totaling at least US\$600-700 million.<sup>84</sup>

In a considerable number of European cities, the PKK had thousands of members and huge sympathizer networks, which helped it in marketing and distribution of illicit drugs.<sup>85</sup> The terrorist organization helped many Kurdish people to immigrate illegally to Western Europe, and all these people were forced to donate significant parts of their incomes to the organization. As Fiona B. Adamson put it, “in addition to voluntary contributions that were harnessed from immigrant communities in Europe, an important source of revenue for the PKK was extortion and protection money. This included protection money collected from Kurdish and Turkish businesses in Germany and other European countries, and forced donations from individuals”.<sup>86</sup>

Apart from these so-called donations and extortion money, Kurdish immigrants were also forced to help

---

84 UNODC Report, *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (Vienna: UNODC, 2010), p. 122.

85 Oscar Palma, ‘Criminal Interests within Political Insurgencies: The Case for Development-Centred Counterinsurgency’ in Fred Cante and Hartmut Quehl (eds.), *Handbook of Research on Transitional Justice and Peace Building in Turbulent Regions*, (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2016), pp. 421-444, p. 427.

86 Fiona B. Adamson, ‘Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War’, in Jeffrey T. Checkel (ed.), *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 63-89, p. 83.

the PKK's drug business operating in Western European cities. As it had no comparable rival in the East and in the West, the PKK, within a short period of time, managed to strengthen its power in the European drug market in terms of production, transportation, distribution and marketing. Kurdish children including, 10-15 year-olds, became drug sellers in front of pubs, pavilions, and even around certain schools in many European capitals.

According to Frank Urbancic, deputy counterterrorism coordinator at the US State Department, the PKK is "the mafia all over Europe." Urbancic says "the PKK has an octopus-like structure carrying out criminal activities, including drug and people smuggling to raise funds, as well as fronts that provide cover for the organizations criminal and terror activities."<sup>87</sup>

The PKK is an active organization not only in drug smuggling, but also in processing, transportation, securing transportation, distribution, and marketing. With reference to 1992 Interpol data, the number of Kurdish organizations related with the drug business was 178 and most of them were under the control of the PKK or they at least gave tribute to the PKK. İkbâl Huseyin Rivzi, Interpol's chief narcotics officer, explained that the PKK was heavily involved in drug trafficking as a means to support its terrorist activities in Turkey. During the same year, the reports of Italian police clearly showed that the PKK set up special teams for international drug business.

The US Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters published the "International Narcot-

87 CNN-TURK, "PKK ahtapot gibi Avrupa'nın her yerinde", 13.02.2008, stated by Frank Urbanic, Deputy Counter-terrorism Coordinator of at US State Department, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/02/13/pkk.ahtapot.gibi.avrupanin.her.yerinde/428046.0/index.html>, <accessed on 06.04.2016>

ics Control Strategy Report" in 1992, in which it stipulates that the European drug cartel is controlled by PKK members. Haluk Bahcekapili, a senior Turkish narcotics agent, argued that "the PKK members were the brains behind the trafficking between Turkey and Western European countries."<sup>88</sup> Some of the money acquired from drug trafficking and extortion goes to the purchase of firearms and other equipment.

According to a report published by the British National Service of Criminal Intelligence in 1993, the PKK acquired about \$75 million from drug smuggling in Europe. Later on, in 1994, PKK members were arrested by Turkish authorities while attempting to smuggle 1.5 tons of hashish into Turkey from one of Turkey's neighboring countries. German high ranking officials also stated that 75% of the heroin caught in this country that year belonged to Kurdish origin Turkish citizens. Moreover, in Germany, 70% of the total drug sales were made by the PKK. Other sources similarly indicate that in 1994 the PKK controlled 60% to 70% of the illegal European drug market. In 1994, in Germany, 30 of the imprisoned PKK members were affiliated with drug crimes. In the same year, the amount of captured PKK drugs was nearly 1.6 tons. An article in a German newspaper (*Kölnische Rundschau*), dated February 2, 1995, also reported that a drug trafficking cartel which operates in South America called "Medellin" had close links with PKK drug dealers who work in Europe. Through this connection, 25 PKK sympathizers were apprehended in Cologne, with 143 kg of heroin.

Turkish Interior Minister Nahit Mentese reported in 1993 that security forces had scored major successes

---

88 Alan Cowell, "Heroin Pouring Through Porous European Borders", *The New York Times*, 9 February 1993.

against Kurdish rebel drug-smuggling operations. Over the year, he said, the police had seized 1,054 kilograms of heroin, 2,884 kg of morphine base, and 23,679 kg of hashish from PKK traffickers. The Turkish Minister added "This terrorist organization gets financial revenues from smuggling drugs abroad, as it does in Turkey." Columnist Enis Berberoğlu, who similarly has written several books on the subject, underlines the connection between the PKK and drug smuggling during the early 1990s: "Turkey was deeply involved in drug smuggling in the mid-1990s. There was a very strong mafia at that time and the PKK (the Kurdish rebel group, the Kurdistan Workers Party) used to take protection money in return for letting them operate in the east".

The PKK activities in Europe enjoyed a move for some time. However, the PKK's propensity to conduct drug business and terrorism led some European countries to understand the global impacts of terrorism and need for international cooperation.<sup>89</sup> Sabah Daily reported that a British Foreign official affirmed that the PKK and its connected KDNs are active in Britain and all other European countries since 2001. In the Sabah Daily's news report, it is noted that Britain specified, "Foreign terrorist organizations would not be allowed to exploit the territories of the United Kingdom to fundraise anymore."<sup>90</sup> As mentioned previously, the PKK actualizes its drug dealing activities with the help of Kurdish and Turkish crime groups living in European countries. The PKK is willing to use children in drug

89 Abdulkadir Onay, *PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe*, Policy Analysis, Washington Institute, Policy Number, 1344, February 21, 2008, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/pkk-criminal-networks-and-fronts-in-europe>, <accessed on 07.04.2016>

90 Sabah Daily's News, *İngiltere'den PKK itirafı*, 24.01.2008, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/01/24/haber,85E08A44F125496DA69076E74948600F.html>, <accessed on 3.04.2016>

distribution in the streets of Europe in order to avoid heavy penal responsibility.

## **2. Children as Drug Sellers in the PKK Narcotic Network**

Apart from taxing narcotics traffickers<sup>91</sup>, direct production, refining and transportation, the PKK became a significant seller in Euro drug business in 1990s. Drug selling processes are mostly handled through street delivery. The street delivery phase is the last one in terrorists and organized crime groups' illicit drug trade.<sup>92</sup> It is a pretty hard work to handle, and requires professionalism and a comprehensive network of distribution. In order to escape strict European laws, the terrorist organization has been using children and teenagers. By using children, the PKK aimed to diminish the risk of being arrested since they did not have penal responsibility. Thus, in order to distribute drugs in European capitals the terror group is generally using children aged 10-12.

Children and teenagers moving drugs for the Kurdish terrorists have been caught throughout Europe on numerous occasions in the 1990s and 2000s. For example, in Hamburg, the German police arrested a group of 11 year-old Kurdish children who had been smuggled into Germany from Turkey in order to sell drugs for the PKK.

The majority of child soldiers found in Europe are linked to the PKK. The PKK has started a campaign to actively recruit children. In 1998, Singer notes that "the

---

91 Aliza Marcus, *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, (New York: New York University Press, 2007), p. 232.

92 Ozgur Nikbay and Suleyman Hancerli, 'Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon' (eds.) *NATO Science For Peace and Security Series, E: Human and Social Dynamics*, Volume 21, IOS Press, 2006, p. 148.

PKK had three thousand underage children within its ranks, with the youngest reported PKK fighter being an armed seven-year-old."<sup>93</sup> Ridley states that PKK recruits children from the deprived populace living in extreme social conditions in Turkey's southeastern urban areas and in European locations.<sup>94</sup> Italian law enforcement arrested PKK terrorists in northern Italy while they were attempting to recruit youngsters.<sup>95</sup>

It deserves note that freedom from penal responsibility and tight and binding family ties (particularly tribal ties), provides terrorists the ability to rely on children dealers, making them very useful for the PKK and Turkish/Kurdish organized crime groups.

### 3. The Sputnik Operation

Cultivation, drug production, trafficking, and the trade chain generated illegal profits wherein laundering is the next stage in the PKK's illicit drug business activities. The Sputnik Operation provided a good example of that link in the chain of income making.

During the 1990s drug business became the most important source revenue for the PKK terrorist organization. The 1996 UN Narcotic Audit Committee's Report indicated the reason why the PKK still stands: narcotic money. Belgium newspapers in 1996 reported that the police believed that the PKK was engaged in drug and arms smuggling, extortion and other crimes in Europe.

During the 1990s the PKK established the so-called NGOs and companies in Western European countries,

---

93 Peter W. Singer, *Children at War*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles :University of California Press, , 2006), p. 19.

94 Nick Ridley, *Terrorist Financing: The Failure of Counter Measures*, *Ibid*, p. 141.

95 Nick Ridley, 'Terrorist Financing: The Failure of Counter Measures' *Ibid*, p. 142.



notably in the UK, Germany, France and Belgium, to launder and transfer the smuggling and extortion money. The 1997 Sputnik Operation (Belgium) showed how the PKK laundered narcotic and other illegal money. The British and Belgium police acted simultaneously together on 18 September 1996, and started a large scale operation called 'Sputnik'.

The operation targeted the PKK linked organizations and members of the terrorist organization under civilian names in the United Kingdom and Belgium (like London-based MED-TV, the so-called Kurdistan Parliament in exile). In Germany and Luxembourg the police also made similar operations against the PKK in their countries. The main juridical foundation of all these operations was money laundering. The narcotic and other illegal money was being laundered by the PKK's TV channel and so-called civilian organizations.

The operation revealed that the PKK's TV channel, the MED-TV, had 350 million Belgium Francs in a bank account in Luxembourg. The police reported that the money came from drugs, arms and human trafficking. In February 1996, a Canadian citizen who had acted on Med-TV was jailed in Luxembourg. According to the Luxembourg police, he tried to launder a big amount of money for PKK organizations in order to receive a commission.

In these years, the terrorist organization laundered money under the name of donations or aids to so-called cultural, children, women, etc. associations in London, Paris, Brussels and other European cities. This money had been collected in certain accounts; later, laundered money was spent for MED TV (now Roj TV), weapons, explosives, militia training and for other PKK business-

es. Another laundering method was buying-selling jewelry and using some other legal investments.

In 1997, the relationship between the terror organization and drug smuggling began to disturb the Western European countries even more, as explained above with Sputnik and some other operations. The terror organization was forced to take more drastic measures to hide its illegal activities. When risks increased in the drug business, the PKK started a propaganda campaign claiming that it was not involved in any illegal drug business. The organization claimed later on that these accusations were part of the Turkish Republic's 'propaganda game' against the PKK. According to PKK propaganda, those people who were caught by the police did not have any relations with the PKK. To support their claims, the PKK, thanks to its social and so-called cultural organizations, started in 1998 a great "No to Drug" campaign in many European countries. As expected with these kind of campaigns, it was not possible for the PKK to clear itself in the eyes of European police and other security forces. However, it should not be forgotten that the English – French police and judiciary are working within a political system, and public opinion naturally influences their operations against criminals. This may be a point that Turkey cannot intercept fully, while the PKK utilizes it to its benefit. While Turkey generally perceives all of Europe (even the West in general) as a single body, the terror organization successfully abuses the Western democracies' weaknesses and the Western pluralist political and legal structures.

#### **4. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in France**

According to Radu, the drug trade in France has been one of the important financing sources for the

PKK.<sup>96</sup> Mincheva and Gurr claim that the PKK is heavily involved in the French and neighboring German drug trade.

For the French police, 80 percent of heroin in Paris in the 1990s was brought by the PKK.<sup>97</sup> Robert Fragnito, in his Stratfor Report, argues that “narcotics trafficking entered Parisian suburbs thanks to the PKK, is responsible for 10 to 80 percent of the heroin smuggled to Paris.”<sup>98</sup>

Several people mostly of Turkish nationality were arrested on October 29, 1996, in Parisian suburbs. That was the end of a fraud that involved 40 million of francs, was linked with Belgium, concerned about 150 relevant victims, and was completed by weapons and narcotics trafficking. The French police in this operation seized 6 kg of heroin, which was worth 20 million francs. According to the French investigators who worked on that case for 18 months, the benefits of all these operations were assigned to the PKK.

Early in 1997, the presumed fund-raiser of the PKK in the south of France was arrested by the French police for sending money to Turkey, allegedly proceeding from drug trafficking. François Haut, director of the De-

---

96 Michael S. Radu, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Dictatorship: Place, Time and Ideology in Global Perspective* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), p. 223.

97 Bill McCollum (ed.), *Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, December 13, 2000, Serial No. 148, p. 30; Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security*, (London: Routledge, 2013); Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan War*, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), p. 10; Jason Stone and Andrea Stone (ed.), *The Drug Dilemma: Responding to a Growing Crisis*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2002), p. 231.

98 Robert Fragnito, STRATFOR Report, *PKK Funding: Operations and Methods*, [https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/8/8595\\_PKK%20FUNDING%20OPERATIONS%20AND%20METHODs.doc](https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/8/8595_PKK%20FUNDING%20OPERATIONS%20AND%20METHODs.doc)<accessed on 04.03.2016>

partment for the Study of the Contemporary Criminal Menace in Paris, argues that the PKK is still responsible for up to 80 percent of narcotics trafficked into Parisian suburbs.

A report published in 1998 by the Italian Finance Police, SCICO, determined that the PKK is 'directly involved' in 'international drug-trafficking,' while also earning illicit proceeds from the 'immigrant trade' and the 'systematic levying of 'protection' payments from Turkish businessmen and workers abroad.'<sup>99</sup> In 1998 the British security service sources estimated that the PKK was responsible for at least 40 percent of the heroin sold in the European Union.

## 5. PKK and Drug Trafficking in the United Kingdom

Drug use is still one of the formidable social problems in the UK. There were 952 deaths that involved heroin or morphine in 2014, the highest since 2001. The National Treatment Agency revealed in 2014 that the number of people under 35 using heroin and crack cocaine was "plummeting", with an estimated 41,508 15- to 24-year-old users.<sup>100</sup> Since the 1980s, the PKK has been an active actor in the London drug trade. The organization dominated the London drug business during the 1990s but its power has been declining compared with other organized crime groups since 2000. However the PKK and PKK-linked gangs are still powerful and want more share from profitable drug trafficking.

99 Michele Steinberg, *PKK Terrorists Named 'Drug Kingpins', Nations Move Against Narcoterrorism*, [http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2008/3530pkk\\_terrorists.html](http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2008/3530pkk_terrorists.html)<accessed on 03.07.2016>

100 Mark Townsend, *Heroin Trade Continues to Claim Lives as UK Drug Gangs Compete for Power*, *The Observer*, Sunday 20 December 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/dec/20/heroin-gangs-london-wood-green-shooting><accessed on 04.02.2016>

In 1993, the British National Crime Intelligence Service estimated that the PKK earned about \$75 million from the illicit drug trade, amounting to 44 percent of their total annual budget.<sup>101</sup>

The PKK in the United Kingdom laundered drug money and made it legal by buying property, investing in businesses, such as restaurants and private clubs, and donating to PKK-linked so-called NGOs. In London, apart from the PKK, the leftist Turkish Dev Sol organization was also active in drug trade in the 1990s. According to Savona both groups had significant numbers, possibly over 1.000 together.<sup>102</sup>

British police reported that in London there was a great quantity of heroin during the 1990s which was smuggled directly from Turkey. Turkish/Kurdish criminals were much more organized than the other groups and extended their influence at the end of the 1990s. Increased Turkish/Kurdish heroin in London caused a fall in the price of heroin<sup>103</sup> and encouraged more people to use it.

The lucrative illicit drug trade allowed the PKK to fund its London-based television station (MED-TV and MEDYA TV<sup>104</sup>), an extensive internet presence, 'Kurdish cultural' organizations in Europe and North America,

---

101 Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security*, *Ibid*, p. 64.

102 Ernesto Savona, *European Money Trails*, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 123.

103 Ernesto Savona, *Ibid*, p. 123.

104 For the London-based PKK television stations also see: Sedat Laciner, 'Bölücü Televizyon Yayıncılığı ve Uluslararası Bağlantıları: MED-TV Örnek Olayı, 1994-1999, (*The Separatist Television Broadcasting and Its International Connections: The Case Study of the MED-TV, 1994-1999*), *Avrasya Dosyası*, Summer 2002, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 329-371; Sedat Laciner, 'MED-TV'nin Etki ve İşlevleri' (*The Impact and Functions of the MED-TV*), *Stratejik Analiz*, Vol. 3, No. 27, July 2002, pp. 119-132.

and backing for the PKK military operations in Turkey and in Iraq.<sup>105</sup>

In addition to the drug money, as US News & World Report states, the "PKK revised millions of dollars by shaking down immigrants in London" and other British cities during the 1990s.<sup>106</sup>

After the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, head of the PKK, and with the dramatic decrease of clashes in the Anatolian mountains, the organization began to give more importance to drug business. According to 2005 European data, the PKK was the primary actor in the European illegal drug trade. The BBC stated that 80% of the European drug market was Turkish origin (meaning Kurdish origin) and that the PKK manages it. The BBC also reports that there are more than 1.000 PKK members in British prisons. According to Turkish authorities, between 1984 and 2000, the number of PKK members caught with drugs is around 700. These numbers clearly state that the PKK has worked with hundreds of people in each country on the transition route.

In 2006, Nick Kochan claimed that, "Turkish and Kurdish gangsters controlled up to 70 percent of the United Kingdom's drug trade."<sup>107</sup> The PKK is strong especially in London. Since 2000, the PKK has preferred to tax Kurdish and Turkish gangs instead of being directly involved in drug kidnapping in order to avoid facing the British government.

105 Michael Radu, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Dictatorship: Place, Time and Ideology in Global Perspective*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006), p. 76; Amarjit S. Narang and Pramila Srivastava (eds.), *Terrorism: The Global Perspective*, (International Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, 2001), p. 98; M. Hakan Yavuz, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey', in Maya Shatzmiller (ed.), *Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), p. 246.

106 U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 126, N. 8-16, 1999, p. 40.

107 Nick Kochan, *The Washing Machine*, (Duckworth, 2006), p. 92.

Similarly, the UK's Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) reported that in 2009, Turkish/Kurdish networks continued to control the heroin supply to Europe.<sup>108</sup>

In 2001, the PKK was banned by the UK. Since the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, members and sympathizers of the organization have been affected by the increased implementation of Terrorism Act 2000.<sup>109</sup>

Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Francis X. Taylor, Ambassador-At-Large For Counter-terrorism, in their joint testimony before the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information (13 March 2002) named the PKK the most important terrorist organization in Europe involved in drug business and said "The PKK 'taxes' ethnic Kurdish drug traffickers and individual cells traffic heroin to support their operations."

Prime Ministers of both states on 27 July 2010 declared that Turkey and the United Kingdom would commit to tackling all forms of terrorism including that of the PKK and organized crime, especially drug trafficking.<sup>110</sup> In spite of the signed documents and co-operation promises the PKK is still active in the UK, particularly in London. The interviews made for the London Borough of Hackney clearly show how much the organization creates terror and crime among the London people:

---

108 UNODC Report, *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (Vienna: UNODC, 2010), p. 122.

109 Latif Taş, 'Kurdish 'Unofficial' Family Law in the Gurbet', in Prakash Shah, Marie-Claire Foblets and Mathias Rohe (eds.), *Family, Religion and Law: Cultural Encounters in Europe*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 209-236, p. 227.

110 Turkey/United Kingdom Strategic Partnership Document, 27 July 2010, <http://ukinturkey.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/21520888/strategic-partnership-doc>

- *"The Turkish community see themselves as being victims of the PKK. They do not see the problem as radicalization or religious rather they view it as political and most importantly, criminal."*
- *"Turkish gangs are an extension of the trouble between the Turks and the Kurds. They have set up a base here. They corrupt innocent children here; they bring their troubles to this country. The young innocent people either get hooked on their drugs or do the mafia-style gangs' dirty work in the field. They are particularly active in Hackney, Har- ingey and Enfield. Serious criminals who deal in extortion, drugs and many other things."*
- *"Particularly Kurdish and Turkish traders suffer as PKK use gangs to carry out their mandate – collecting money as a tax... 'We do not think we have an issue with extremism, on the other hand my community thinks the Govern- ment has a double standard and is keeping one eye shut to extremist PKK terrorism organization with its illegal ac- tivities in this country and in Turkey and Europe as well. Turning a blind eye and saying nothing."*
- *"Big issue is double standards as PKK are actively engag- ing terrorists in this country. Traders pay extortion to these guys - that's terrorism."*
- *"I'd like to say there is terrorism recruitment in Hackney by the PKK, but it's being ignored. They recruit openly, put their posters up and raise money; they have protection rackets and drug deals. This is one of the biggest terrorism organizations in the world who fundraise over here, then buy bombs and kill people over there. That terrorism is ignored here."<sup>111</sup>*

The 2013 Hackney Report strongly underlines that the Turkish community feel that their community is be-

---

111 Report for London Borough of Hackney, *Communities Views on the Government's Prevent Strategy Within Hackney*, January 2013, (London: Griffin Research and Consultancy Ltd, 2013), p. 8-9, 15.



ing victimized in a highly criminal manner by the PKK with no action being taken against them. As the Report states, the UK does not appear to be a target for PKK extremist atrocities so the risk for the UK state is low<sup>112</sup> as a target but the PKK is still strong in London as a criminal organization.

## 6. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Germany

Germany was fertile ground for the PKK because Germany provided safe asylum for the new comers of the terrorist organization. Germany's problems with the PKK started when the fights between radical nationalists and the PKK imported to Germany.<sup>113</sup> German authorities could not ignore the radical nationalists, the PKK and inter-group conflict in the Kurdish diaspora in Germany.<sup>114</sup>

The PKK had relations with German militant groups too. Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF)<sup>115</sup> helped the PKK organize rallies in Bonn, and RAF members visited PKK bases in Turkey<sup>116</sup> in order to train militants and establish strong cooperation between the two terror organizations.

The 1992 Duisburg Operation is a good example of how drug trafficking helps the PKK to arm. On 17 September 1992, 21 kg of heroin was sized in Duisburg

---

112 *Communities Views on the Government's Prevent Strategy Within Hackney*, Report for London Borough of Hackney, January 2013, (London: Griffin Research and Consultancy Ltd, 2013), p. 26.

113 Maria Tomczak, *Germany and External Terrorism*, *Przegląd Zachodni*, 2013, No. 2 157-168 p. 160 2013, No. II

114 Leggewie, C. (1996). How Turks became Kurds, not Germans. *Dissent*, 43(3), 79-83. P. 79.

115 *Rote Armee Fraktion*. In its early stages commonly known as the Baader-Meinhof Group.

116 David L. Phillips, *The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015), p. 32.

town in a truck registered to Kaya Transportation Company. The German BKA authorities sent the captured documents to the Turkish Police, and it is understood that Osman Kaya, who was the owner of the company, was at the same time the person operating a network which provided weapons and ammunition to the PKK. Police also captured 18 Kalashnikovs and 4.000 rounds of ammunition from the PKK concealed in one of the trucks of the same company on 19 April 1993.<sup>117</sup>

After it carried out a campaign of fire-bombings on Turkish and German institutions in Berlin, Germany banned the PKK in 1993 and closed 34 'Kurdish cultural centers'.<sup>118</sup> German authorities accused these PKK-linked organizations of extorting funds from Turkish and Kurdish workers and of being involved in other illegal activities. However, the German intelligence services estimated that the PKK network in Germany had thousands of members. For the PKK, Germany is comparatively more important than any other European country in financing its terrorist activities and Turkey pressures Germany to actively combat terrorism's financial sources. As a result of these efforts, in recent years, a number of PKK members have been arrested in Germany for securing financing for the terrorist organization. According to German police sources, the PKK is also involved in drug trafficking in Germany. "Police have confirmed that several investigations have revealed a link between the PKK and drug dealers."

German police seized 9.475 kg of heroin from five PKK members in a refugee camp in 1993.<sup>119</sup> In 1994, the

117 Ahmet Pek and Behsat Ekici, 'Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of the PKK-KONGRA GEL from Illicit Drug Business' in Ozgur Nikbay and Suleyman Hancerli (eds.), *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon*, IOS Press, 2007, pp. 140-153, p. 147.

118 Phillips, *The Kurdish...*, p. 32.

119 Pek and Ekici, Ahmet Pek and Behsat Ekici, 'Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of the PKK-KONGRA GEL from Illicit Drug Business', *Ibid.*, p. 147.

PKK had a strict control over extortion and protection money activities among the Kurds and Turks in Germany. 69 out of every 100 incidents of extortion that occurred in Germany in 1994 were somehow connected with the PKK.<sup>120</sup>

Weekly magazine Der Spiegel in its 1995 December issue stated that the PKK used children in drug distribution and selling. According to Der Spiegel, the mosque in St. George district of Hamburg was used by the organization's drug dealers as a meeting point and a place to affect the local communities.

In 1995, several German high-ranking intelligence officials met with Abdullah Ocalan in Damascus (Syria). Afterwards, on 30 September 1995, intelligence agent Heinrich Lummer, a political ally of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, met with the PKK leader. The Germans in these meetings brought to Ocalan's attention their unhappiness with the PKK's involvement in drug trafficking in Germany and the disorder it created in German cities.<sup>121</sup> Lummer told Neues Deutschland that Ocalan had promised not to encourage violence in Germany.<sup>122</sup> It can be said that the German Government saw co-operation with the Turkish Government in order to prevent PKK illegal activities in Germany was not enough to save public order in the country.

---

120 Fiona B. Adamson, 'Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War', in Jeffrey T. Checkel (ed.), *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 63-89, p. 83. Also see Christopher W. Ross (ed.), *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997*, (United States Department of State, April 1998), p. 15.

121 Robert Olson, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq Since the Gulf War', in Robert Olson (ed.), *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, (The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 91.

122 Cited in Enis Berberoglu, 'PKK ve Almanya Arasında Pazarlık' (Bargain between PKK and Germany), *Hurriyet*, 2 September 1997.

After the German visits to Ocalan, the PKK decreased violence in the country and 'Kas Nehm of the Federal Prosecutor's Office announced that the PKK was no longer regarded as a terrorist organization but rather as a criminal organization,<sup>123</sup> although Germany Interior Ministry claimed the PKK was still on Germany's terrorist organizations list.

In 1999, Hans Dieter Klosa, Security Chief of Hannover, declared that there was a direct connection between the PKK and the illicit drug trafficking networks. Klosa said "the direct connection between the two has been proven." For Klosa, the PKK transferred very week more than 1 million Deutsche Marks from drug trade to terror activities. Klosa further said that the PKK had taxed other drug dealers in Germany and Western Europe.<sup>124</sup>

Germany security authorities with at least 700 police made a huge operation in Hamburg and Hannover against the PKK. The police captured heroin in these operations and arrested 11 Kurdish-origin drug dealers.<sup>125</sup>

Turkish and German police (BKA) ran a joint project called Asena/Anadolu. The project revealed that the PKK was monopolizing and professionalizing drug trafficking by cooperating with Kurdish organized crime groups and forcing the political Kurdish refugees into illicit drug trafficking.<sup>126</sup>

123 Andrew Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror: 'For Forty Years We Fought Alone'*, *Ibid*, p.7.

124 'PKK'lı Uyuşturucu Kanıtı Almanya'dan (Proof for PKK Drug is from Germany), *Hürriyet* (daily), 19 July 1999, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/pkk-li-uyusturucu-kaniti-almanya-dan-39092018>

125 'PKK'lı Uyuşturucu Kanıtı Almanya'dan (Proof for PKK Drug is from Germany), *Hürriyet* (daily), 19 July 1999, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/pkk-li-uyusturucu-kaniti-almanya-dan-39092018>

126 Ahmet Pek and Behsat Ekici, Ahmet Pek and Behsat Ekici, 'Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of the PKK-KONGRA GEL from Illicit Drug Business', *Ibid*, p. 141.

Germany's police forces, law enforcement agencies and legal branches of the government allocate enormous resources to fighting illegal drug trafficking.<sup>127</sup> Germany spends around 4 billion Euros a year to fight against the drug issue, including several measures on security and law-enforcement regulations.<sup>128</sup> However, beyond the government's effort to make the country drug free organized crime terrorist networks do not allow it to go further.

A recent report, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2015), released by the US State Department, indicated that German and Turkish organized crime groups dominate the drug trade in Germany. According to the Stratfor report published on WikiLeaks about PKK's structural analysis, it is stated that the PKK's income comes from two major sources in Europe. The first and major market is Germany according to the Stratfor's report. In 1997, the Federal Ministry of Interior explained that there are 11.000 PKK sympathizers in Germany, and the PKK has the potential to mobilize more people among the almost 500.000 Kurdish residents in Germany.<sup>129</sup>

---

127 Barbara Hardinghaus, *Duped by dope: Reality Trumps Ideals German Drug War*, Spiegel Online, March 21, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/drug-war-failing-in-germany-a-889826.html><accessed on 03.09.2016>

128 2011 National Report to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Germany: New Developments, Trends and In-Depth Information on Selected Issues - Drug Situation 2010/2011" (German Reference Centre for the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (Deutsche Beobachtungsstelle fuer Drogen und Drogensucht, DBDD), the Institute for Therapy Research (Institut fuer Therapieforschung, IFT), the Federal Centre for Health Education (Bundeszentrale fuer gesund heitliche Aufklaerung, BZgA) and the German Centre for Addiction Issues (Deutsche Hauptstelle fuer Suchtfragen, DHS)), (Lisbon, Portugal: EMCDDA, Nov. 2012), p. 31. [http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att\\_191753\\_EN\\_Germany\\_2011....](http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_191753_EN_Germany_2011....) - See more at: <http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Germany#sthash.BEolUgS6.dpuf>

129 Fragnito, Robert, PKK Funding: Operations and Methods. Stratfor Report Published on Wiki Leaks. Also shared on <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,565298,00.html>

Kay Nehm, a former state prosecutor, argued in 1998 that the "PKK behaved like a criminal rather than a terrorist (or guerrilla) organization."<sup>130</sup> Focus Magazine reported on 7 September 1999 that Hamburg and Hannover police forces organized an operation against the PKK connected with a heroin distribution network. German police reported that the PKK has earned at least 1 million Marks from the taxes taken from heroin distribution.

In 2007, many PKK members who were involved in drug dealing were arrested in European countries, especially in the transit countries for drugs coming from the east.<sup>131</sup> For instance, on 19 December 2007, three fundraisers for the PKK who were involved in drug dealing were arrested in Bucharest, the capital of Romania. The Romanian public prosecutor declared that the PKK members organized the transportation of 58 kg of heroin, destined for the Netherlands. The suspects – two from Turkey and one from Syria- were all Romanian residents. They belonged to a trafficking ring which extended to Ukraine. As a matter of fact, Romania (with Bulgaria) has always been a vital transit route for PKK drug smuggling from Turkey to Europe. The country has always been important for arms transfers from Western Europe to Turkey. Marko Hajdinjak claims that Kurdish smugglers along with the Arabs have controlled the heroin trade in the Balkans and they have dominated the Romanian route. Hajdinjak says "Indications exist that the profits from Kurdish-run heroin trade are used for financing the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)".

130 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, 'Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK', in James J. F. Forest, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 65-88, p. 72.

131 UNODC Report, *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (Vienna: UNODC, 2010).

Germany and neighboring countries are still the most important source of finance for the PKK. Investigations in Germany and Belgium has revealed ongoing extortion of enormous sums from Kurdish business people in legitimate business, such as restaurants or markets as well as in the drug trade and other illegal business.<sup>132</sup>

## 7. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Netherlands

The Netherlands is one of the significant countries in terms of the PKK's drug trafficking. Thanks to the strong Kurdish diaspora in the country, the organization has enjoyed the advantages of the hierarchical and extensive network.

Police in the Netherlands investigated and first uncovered the PKK's involvement in drug and arms smuggling in 1993.<sup>133</sup> Since then, the PKK has always been an important player in Dutch drug trafficking problems. Between 2004 and 2005, the amount of drugs caught only in the Netherlands was more than 400 kg.

Since 2007, according to the Dutch security services, the PKK have had a significant supportive presence in the Netherlands, with a priority of raising funds and sending supplies to the PKK operatives in Northern Iraq.<sup>134</sup>

The PKK in the Netherlands has been getting money from rich drug traders by the use of force or threats. It can be said that the organization in the Netherlands re-

---

132 Louise I. Shelley, *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 137.

133 Claire Metelits, *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior*, (New York: New York University Press, 2010), p.146.

134 Nick Ridley, *Terrorist Financing: The Failure of Counter Measures*, *Ibid*, p. 140.

lies in part on the drug income in by way of extortion.<sup>135</sup> In 1999, The *Washington Times* reported that a prime source of revenue in the Netherlands for the PKK was extortion money obtained from Kurdish-owned businesses.<sup>136</sup> In the words of Louise I. Shelly, from George Mason University, "the PKK still forces Turks of Kurdish origin residing in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and other Western European countries to contribute to their cause or face great physical harm."<sup>137</sup>

## 8. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Italy

Four Kurds were arrested in Milan, Italy on a TIR truck carrying 100 kg of hidden heroin in 1989. The driver, Nazim Kelo, told Italian investigators that the heroin had come from the PKK, for whom he had worked for years. In 1991, a PKK confessor said that between 1988 and 1990, he carried more than 300 kg heroin to Europe only on his own. According to Interpol, in 1992, the PKK was orchestrating approximately 80% of the European drug market.

In 1993, Italy and Turkey concluded an agreement to cooperate against drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism.<sup>138</sup> In March, 1995, Italian President Oscar Lu-

135 Cyrille Fijnaut, Frank Bovenkerk, Gerben Burinsma and Henk Van De Bunt, *Organized Crime in the Netherlands*, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 98.

136 Helle Bering, 'Europe's Kurdish Headache', *Washington Times*, 24 February 1999.

137 Louise I. Shelley, *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 137; Louise Shelley, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 71.

138 Robert Olson, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq Since the Gulf War', in Robert Olson (ed.), *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, (The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 121.



igi Scalfaro visited Turkey and both sides discussed the PKK's involvement in drug trafficking and organized crime.

Italian Daily *Il Giornale* reported that the director of the Italian Police Force's Central Operations Service, Alessandro Pansa, issued a report, 'New Guide to Fighting Money Laundering,' on the issue to the Italian Bankers Association in December, 1998. He mentioned in his report that the PKK was the main group behind the heroin trade. Heroin from Anatolia [the Turkish peninsula] has now taken over as the main product on the market. A 1998 report by the Italian Financial Police, SCICO, came up with similar estimates *Il Giornale* reported. The police agency determined that the PKK is "directly involved" in "international drug-trafficking."

### **9. PKK-Linked Drug Smuggling in Denmark**

In 1993, the Slagelse police and the Nacro Section of the National Police Turn-Out force in Denmark found out after a 3-year investigation that several armed robberies had been committed in order to finance narcotics purchases. According to Danish daily *Berlingske Tidende*, police captured Inga Larsen of Denmark who had links with two Turkish narcotic kingpins living in Denmark: "Ali Nazim Sivrikaya and Kara Mehmet Seilmis, also known as. During the trial, the close relations between Carlos and the PKK was proven. Superintendent Niels Bech of the Danish National Police Turn-out Force expressed that large parts of the profits from narcotics sales in Denmark have returned to Turkey. Carlos even got people to send the money via a post in Germany. In one case, 140.000 were sent to Mustafa Agdeve in Turkey, who in return sent kilos of heroin to Europe."<sup>139</sup>

---

139 *Berlingske Tidende*, 31 October 1993

The PKK has an active role in the illegal drug business in Denmark. According to the Danish Health and Medicines Authority, the number of drug users in the country is over 33.000 (2010). Denmark is also a transit country for drug trafficking between Germany and the Scandinavian countries. The PKK uses unknown people who have no direct link with the organization for drug business in this region. The Danish police reports that the two major outlaw motorcycle gangs, the Hell's Angels and the Banditos, are actively involved in importation and distribution of cocaine and hashish. Whether there is a link between the PKK and these organizations is not known. The PKK, apart from drug trafficking, is also relying on Kurdish Businessmen in Denmark, Netherlands and Germany.

### 10. US Labels PKK as Drug Smuggling Kingpin

The US State Department indicated as early as 1992 that the PKK was involved in the acquisition, importation, and distribution of drugs in international arena.<sup>140</sup>

A 1995 report prepared by the Drug Enforcement Agency of the US Department of Justice also emphasized that the PKK is engaged in drug trafficking and money laundering activities and is well-established in the production of almost all kinds of opium products and their smuggling.

Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs noted American concern on the drug-PKK connection during a press conference at the Foreign Press Center in Washington in October, 1995.<sup>141</sup>

140 Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment: Readings & Interpretations*, (McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), p. 252.

141 Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 174.

Admiral William Studeman, the Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency between 1993-95, argued during his address to the US House Judiciary Committee that the PKK was a threat not only to Turkey but to the US. According to Kirisci and Winrow, the PKK's growing involvement in drug trafficking was seen as a significant threat to US interests.<sup>142</sup>

In a US House of Representatives session, Representative Bill McCollum claimed that "the PKK has always been in the drug business".<sup>143</sup>

The PKK, as well as a Turkish national and other foreign organizations and individuals, were put on a US list of suspected drug traffickers in June 2008. The US Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, which became law in December 1999, targets major foreign narcotics traffickers, their organizations and operatives worldwide. The terrorist organization will be denied access to the US financial system and all trade transactions involving US companies and individuals under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, according to a statement released by the White House. Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the National Security Council said "Now that the PKK has been designated under the kingpin act, the penalties for doing business with them are much higher... We also now have the authority to target and designate other PKK entities and associates for narcotics activity. Before, we were limited to this group's terror activities."

Asa Hutchinson, Administrator for the US Drug Enforcement Administration, in 2002, stated before the

---

142 Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish...*, p. 174.

143 Bill McCollum (ed.), Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, December 13, 2000, Serial No. 148, p. 59.

Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information that “the PKK is involved in the taxation of drug shipments and the protection of drug traffickers.”<sup>144</sup>

President George W. Bush described the group as a “common enemy” during the November Summit with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. US experts and administration officials believe that the PKK has taken advantage of Turkey's strategic location between the poppy fields of Central Asia and the vast market of Europe and has used drug smuggling to finance its activities since as early as the 1980s. According to the American narcotics specialists, the terrorist group not only “taxed” the drug traffickers but also was directly engaged in trafficking.<sup>145</sup>

Parallel to these arguments the Jane Intelligence Review in 2008 argued that the share of drug money with Diaspora funding had increased the PKK financial sources. “PKK financing has shifted from state support to self-financing through Diaspora funding and drug trafficking”.<sup>146</sup>

According to the Jane Intelligence Review, the war in Iraq has further facilitated the narcotic source of income for the terrorist organization as substantial amounts of heroin formerly transiting through Iran are now re-routed through Iraq. The journal says “While the PKK's

144 *Statement of Asa Hutchinson Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, DEA Congressional Testimony, March 13, 2002, <http://www.dea.gov/pr/speeches-testimony/2002t/ct031302p.html>*

145 “US labels PKK drug smuggling kingpin”, Today's Zaman, 2 June 2008; “US imposes sanctions on PKK group”, BBC News, 30 May 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7428802.stm>

146 ‘Kurds and Pay – Examining PKK Financing’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 13 March 2008.

involvement in drug trafficking is clear, its exact extent and nature is not”.

In its ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2009’ the US Department of State highlighted increasing patterns of self-funding activities by the PKK. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and British National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) confirmed the State Department and “use similar language to characterize criminal activities pursued by the PKK (and the FARC)”. The reports also classified the PKK as networked “full service organization because its criminality has graduated from taxing and extortion schemes to managing aspects of production and international sales of illicit drugs.”<sup>147</sup>

According to the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), “the PKK was involved in taxing drug shipments and protecting drug traffickers”.<sup>148</sup>

A study published in 2002 by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress defined the PKK as a “terrorist organization with various illegal trafficking and money-laundering activities that depend heavily on links in Western Europe. Because it is known to have dealt extensively with criminal organizations in trafficking both arms and narcotics, the PKK has been an important nexus of criminal activities with terrorism.”<sup>149</sup>

---

147 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, ‘Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK’, in James J. F. Forest, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 65-88, p. 69; Michael Flax,

148 Claire Metelits, *Inside Insurgency. Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior*, (New York: New York University Press, 2010), p. 145.

149 G. Curtis and T. Karacan, *The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe*, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 2002), p. 18; Oscar Palma, ‘Criminal Interests within Political Insurgencies: The Case for Development-Centred Counterinsurgency’ in Fred Cante and Hartmut Quehl (eds.), *Handbook of*

Similarly, Prof. Dr. Norman Stone confirms in his article in the *Spectator* that the PKK is in the drug smuggling business: "It kills innocents, it deals in drugs".<sup>150</sup>

The Ankara office of the DEA reported an increase in 2010 in the number of US-destined heroin trafficking cases, however, the amount of heroin from Turkey entering the US, either directly or through another transit state, remained low.<sup>151</sup>

In 2011, the US government declared that the PKK partially finances its activities through criminal activities, including its operation of a European-wide drug trafficking network.<sup>152</sup>

The US Treasury Department, in February, 2012, sanctioned supporters of the PKK who ran significant drug trafficking networks based in Moldova and Romania.<sup>153</sup>

A report released in March, 2013, by the US State Department revealed that the militant organization had drug trafficking networks based in Moldova and Romania. The 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) which was prepared by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the State Department said that "many major drug traffickers in Turkey are ethnic Kurds or Iranians."

---

*Research on Transitional Justice and Peace Building in Turbulent Regions*, (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2016), pp. 421-444, p. 427.

150 Norman Stone, "Turkey is right to fight for an end to the PKK", *The Spectator*, 27 October 2007.

151 Turkey Foreign Policy and Government Guide, Vol. 1, Annual Report, (International Business Publications, 2010), p. 23.

152 U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, "Five PKK Leaders Designated Narcotics Traffickers," April 20, 2011.

153 'US-Turkey Narcotics Cooperation and Assistance', in *United States Assistance to Turkey Handbook*, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: International Business Publications, 2014. P. 98.



## CONCLUSION





In brief, the illegal drug trade is the most crucial financial source of terror and a major precursor of the collapse of the legal state in Turkey. The drug trade has for many long years supplied the finances of the PKK and other terror organizations. This continues today. If Turkey succeeds in ending drug smuggling, in order to end terror, it will reach more effective solutions rather than bombing the Kandil Mountain. As Michael Freeman notes, if terrorist groups do not have enough money, their violence will have to come to an end.<sup>154</sup>

Turkey, on the one hand, must eliminate the areas that are exploited by terrorists and extremists, and at the same time it must destroy the financial infrastructure of terrorism and other crimes by curbing drug smuggling. Otherwise, the Turks will continue to live with problems like robbery in the streets of Istanbul, terror in the mountains of southeast Anatolia and political assassinations at the most sensitive times.

We should also note that Turkey desperately needs the immediate help of European countries in its combat

---

154 Michael Freeman, "The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34, no. 6 (2011): 461.

against terrorism. The 'monster' is too big for Turkey, and the Turks cannot overcome the problem without the EU's help. At the same time, the drug smuggling mainly targets the youth in Western European countries, and the EU cannot stop the illegal drug problem without real co-operation with Turkey.

In this study, we've found that the PKK (The Kurdistan Worker's Party) is notably active in drug trafficking, which makes a significant contribution to its budget. However, we need to state that the role of the PKK in drug trafficking is not as simple as the role of other terrorist organizations. The PKK has immense areas of influence in many countries. It establishes its activities over the masses in Turkey and Kurdish Diasporas in Europe. Additionally there are tribes (*aşiret*) that are also running as individual organizations in drug trafficking. Therefore, it is seen that a portion of the income obtained from many illegal activities, which seem to have nothing to do with the PKK, is transferred to the organization as donations, tributes, and commissions or so called "tax." In other words, the visible part of the PKK's drug trafficking business is just the tip of the iceberg. In the words of Mincheva and Gurr, "specialised reports on narco-trafficking observe that given the complex and mixed PKK/Turkish/Kurdish structure of criminal interaction, the PKK's true share of the narcotics market cannot be precisely identified."<sup>155</sup>

In the post-Cold War era, terror has vitally threatened the international community more and states somehow could not establish a necessary cooperation against terrorism. International drug trafficking is also a

---

155 Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security*, *Ibid*, p. 65.

type of crime that feeds all kinds of terrorism. The PKK example shows us that drug trafficking and terrorism are simultaneous threats to the security of the international community. Therefore, the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism deserves special attention.



# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## Books and Articles

1. Adamson, Fiona B. 'Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War', in Jeffrey T. Checkel (ed.), *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
2. Alexander, Dean C. *Business Confronts Terrorism, Risks and Responses*, (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004)
3. Asal, Victor. *When Terrorists Go Bad: Analyzing Terrorist Organizations' Involvement in Drug Smuggling*, *International Studies Quarterly*, (2015) Number 59
4. Bakar, Ayhan. *Justice and Home Affairs: Impact of the European Union on the Internal Security of Turkey*, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012)
5. Bal, Ihsan., and Sedat Laçiner, *Ethnic Terrorism in Turkey and the Case of the PKK: Roots, Structure, Survival, and Ideology*, (London: Frank Cass, 2004)
6. Barkey, Henri J., and Graham Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Problem*, (Oxford: Carnegie, 1998)
7. Barnhart, Stephen R. *International Terrorism and Political Violence Guide*, (Victoria: Trafford, 2002)
8. Başer, Bahar. *Diaspora Politics and Germany's Kurdish Question*, December 6, 2013

9. Bering, Helle. 'Europe's Kurdish Headache', *Washington Times*, 24 February 1999
10. Berry, La Verle. et al. Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism. Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, 2003
11. Boon, Kristen E., Aziz Huq and Douglas C. Lovelace (eds.), *Narco-terrorism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)
12. Braun, Michael. *Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?*, Policy Analysis, No. 392, July 25, 2008, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/drug-trafficking-and-middle-eastern-terrorist-groups-a-growing-nexus><accessed on 02.06.2005>
13. Brewda, Joseph. "PKK Heroin Cartel Threatens Europe", *EIR*, Vol. 26, No. 6, Feb. 5, 1999, December 15, *Daily Il Giornale*
14. Charles, Robert B. *Narcotics and Terrorism: Links, Logic, and Looking Forward*, (Chelsea House, 2004)
15. Clarkson, Wensley. *Hash: The Secret and Chilling Story Behind of the Drug's Deadly Underworld*, (London: Quercus Editions Ltd., 2013)
16. Clutterbuck, Richard. *Terrorism, Drugs & Crime in Europe After 1992*, (Abingdon: Routledge Revival, 1990)
17. Cowell, Alan. "Heroin Pouring Through Porous European Borders", *The New York Times*, 9 February 1993
18. Curtis, G., and T. Karacan, *The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe*, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 2002)
19. Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime KOM, *Drug Connection of PKK Terrorist Organization*. (Ankara; KOM Yayinlari, 1998)
20. Eager, Paige W. *From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and Political Violence*, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008)
21. Eccarius-Kelly, Vera. 'Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK', in James J. F. Forest, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 65-88

22. Eccarius-Kelly, Vera. *The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011)
23. Ekici, Behsat. 'International Drug Trafficking and National Security of Turkey', *Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2014
24. Ekici, Behsat., Phil Williams, Ayhan Akbulut, 'The PKK and the KDNs: cooperation, convergence or Conflict?' Strozier, Charles and Frank James, (Eds) *The PKK: financial sources, social and political dimensions*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Publications, 2012
25. Fijnaut, Cyrille., Frank Bovenkerk, Gerben Burinsma and Henk Van De Bunt, *Organized Crime in the Netherlands*, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998)
26. Freeman, Michael. 'Introduction to Financing Terrorism: Case Studies', in (eds.) Michael Freeman, *Financing Terrorism, Case Studies*, (England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012)
27. Freeman, Michael. 'The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34, no. 6 (2011)
28. Friedrichs, Jörg. *Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and International Police Cooperation*, (London: Routledge, 2008)
29. Galeotti, Mark. 'Turkish Organized Crime: From Tradition to Organized Crime', in Dina Siegel and Henk Van de Bunt (Eds.), *Traditional Organized Crime in the Modern World: Responses to Socioeconomic Change*, Springer, Newyork 2012
30. Giraldo, Jeanne K., and Harold A. Trinkunas (ed.), *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007)
31. Grigorova, Lyubov., Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security*, (London: Routledge, 2013)
32. Howard, Russell D., and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment: Readings & Interpretations*, (McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004)



33. Karaman, Haydar. 'Terrorism and Its Financial Sources', Strategic Outlook, December 2012, [http://www.strategic-outlook.org/publications/Terrorism\\_and\\_Its\\_Financial\\_Sources.pdf](http://www.strategic-outlook.org/publications/Terrorism_and_Its_Financial_Sources.pdf), <Accessed on 07.04.2016>
34. Kirişçi, Kemal., and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997)
35. Kochan, Nick. *The Washing Machine*, (Duckworth, 2006)
36. Koknar, Ali. *Counter-Terrorism and International Security* 1998
37. Laçiner, Sedat. 'Bölücü Televizyon Yayıncılığı ve Uluslararası Bağlantıları: MED-TV Örnek Olayı, 1994-1999, (*The Seperatist Television Broadcasting and Its International Connections: The Case Study of the MED-TV, 1994-1999*), *Avrasya Dosyası*, Summer 2002, Vol. 8, No. 2
38. Laçiner, Sedat. 'Children of Terror: The Case of the PKK', *Review of International Law and Politics*, 6 (2010)
39. Laçiner, Sedat. 'MED-TV'nin Etki ve İşlevleri' (*The Impact and Functions of the MED-TV*), *Stratejik Analiz*, Vol. 3, No. 27, July 2002
40. Leggewie, C. How Turks became Kurds, not Germans. *Dissent*, 43(3), 1996
41. Mango, Andrew. *Turkey on the War on Terror* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005)
42. Marcus, Aliza. *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, (New York: New York University Press, 2007)
43. Mater, Nadire. *Voices from the Front: Turkish Soldiers on the War with the Kurdish Guerrillas*, (New York: Palgrave, 2005)
44. McCoy, Alfred W. 'The Stimulus of Prohibition', in Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs and Kent Mathewson (eds.), *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
45. McCulloch, Jude, and Sharon Pickering, *Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: Proliferating State Crime, Eroding Censure and Extending Neo-colonialism*. (*British Journal of Criminology* 45: 470–486, 2005)

46. Metelits, Claire. *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior*, (New York: New York University Press, 2010)
47. Nachmani, Amikam. *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003)
48. Narang Amarjit S., and Pramila Srivastava (eds.), *Terrorism: The Global Perspective*, (International Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, 2001)
49. Nikbay, Ozgur., and Suleyman Hancerli, 'Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon' (eds.) *NATO Science For Peace and Security Series, E: Human and Social Dynamics*, Volume 21, IOS Press, 2006
50. Olson, Robert. 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq Since the Gulf War', in Robert Olson (ed.), *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, (The University Press of Kentucky, 1996)
51. Onay, Abdulkadir. *PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe*, Policy Analysis, Washington Institute, Policy Number, 1344, February 21, 2008, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/pkk-criminal-networks-and-fronts-in-europe>, <accessed on 07.04.2016>
52. Palma, Oscar. 'Criminal Interests within Political Insurgencies: The Case for Development-Centered Counterinsurgency' in Fred Cante and Hartmut Quehl (eds.), *Handbook of Research on Transitional Justice and Peace Building in Turbulent Regions*, (Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2016)
53. Pek, Ahmet., and Behsat Ekici, *Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of PKK-KONGRA GEL From Illicit Drug Business*, Ozgur Nikbay and Suleyman Hangerli (Eds) *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective*, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, 2007
54. Peters, Gretchen. *Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan War*, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009)

55. Phillips, David L. 'The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East', (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015)
56. Piazza, James. UNODC Background Guide, *Narcoterrorism – The Financial Backbone of Terrorist Organizations*, THSMUN, 2015
57. Piazza, James. 'The illicit drug trade, counternarcotic strategies and terrorism', Public Choice, Vol. 149, No. 3/4, The Many Faces of Counterterrorism, December 2011
58. Pieth, Mark. (ed.), *Financing Terrorism*, (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003)
59. Prasad, Nitin. *The Financing of Terrorism*, (Delhi: Alpha Editions, 2016)
60. Radu, Michael S. *Dilemmas of Democracy and Dictatorship: Place, Time and Ideology in Global Perspective* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006)
61. Radu, Michael S. 'Terrorism is Free Speech', 2004, <http://www.tetedeturc.com/home/spip.php?article659><accessed on 04.07.2016>
62. Ridley, Nick. *Terrorist Financing: The Failure of Counter Measures*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012)
63. Romano, David. *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
64. Ross, Christopher W. (ed.), *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1997*, (United States Department of State, April 1998)
65. Ruehsen, Moyara. 'Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK)', in Michael Freeman (ed.), *Financing Terrorism: Case Studies*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012)
66. Savona, Ernesto. *European Money Trails*, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999)
67. Shanty, Frank. *The Nexus: International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011)
68. Shelley, Louise I. *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014)

69. Shelley, Louise I. *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
70. Simon, David R. *Tony Soprano's America: The Criminal Side of the American Dream*, (Westview Press, 2002)
71. Singer, Peter W. *Children at War*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006)
72. Smith, Paul J. 'Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to Terrorism Money Trail', in James J. F. Forest (ed.), *Essentials of Counterterrorism*, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015)
73. Söyler, Mehtap. *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (New York: Routledge, 2015)
74. Steinberg, Michele. *PKK Terrorists Named 'Drug Kingpins', Nations Move Against Narcoterrorism*, [http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2008/3530pkk\\_terrorists.html](http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2008/3530pkk_terrorists.html)<accessed on 03.07.2016>
75. Stone, Jason. and Andrea Stone (ed.), *The Drug Dilemma: Responding to a Growing Crisis*, (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2002)
76. Stone, Norman. "Turkey is right to fight for an end to the PKK", *The Spectator*, 27 October 2007
77. Tahiri, Hussein. *Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State*, (Mazda Publishers, 2007)
78. Taş, Latif. 'Kurdish 'Unofficial' Family Law in the Gurbet', in Prakash Shah, Marie-Claire Foblets and Mathias Rohe (eds.), *Family, Religion and Law: Cultural Encounters in Europe*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014)
79. Tomczak, Maria., *Germany and External Terrorism*, *Przeład Zachodni*, 2013, No. 2
80. 'US-Turkey Narcotics Cooperation and Assistance', in *United States Assistance to Turkey Handbook*, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: International Business Publications, 2014
81. White, Jonathan R. *Terrorism and Homeland Security*, (Cengage, 2014)

82. Williams, Phil. 'Terrorist Financing', in Paul Shemella (ed.), *Fighting Back, What Governments can do about Terrorism*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)
83. Wise, Ed., and Jennifer Lang, 'Counterterrorism in Turkey: Implications of the Syrian Crisis for Jihadist and Kurdish Terrorism', in Kenan Aksu (ed.), *Turkey: A Regional Power in the Making*, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013)
84. Witschi, Beat. 'Who is Abdullah Ocalan?', 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/05/12/ocalan.profile/><accessed on 07.04.2016>
85. Yavuz, Hakan M. 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey', in Maya Shatzmiller (ed.), *Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005)

### Newspapers and Periodicals

1. Arpacık, Cihat. *PKK'nın Vazgeçemediği 1 Milyar Liralık Esrar*, *Yeni Şafak Daily*, July 7, 2013, <http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/pkknin-vazgecemedigi-1-milyar-liralik-esrar-536972?p=1><accessed on 03.03.2016>
2. Berberoğlu, Enis. 'PKK ve Almanya Arasındaki Pazarlık' (Bargain between PKK and Germany), *Hurriyet*, 2 September 1997
3. *Berlingske Tidende*, 31 October 1993
4. CNN-TURK News, PKK ahtapot gibi Avrupa'nın her yerinde, February 13, 2008, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/02/13/pkk.ahtapot.gibi.avrupanin.her.yerinde/428046.0/index.html><accessed on 03.03.2016>
5. Focus Magazine, *PKK Mit Drogengeld den Terror finanziert*, July 19, 1999 [http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/pkk-mit-drogengeld-den-terror-finanziert\\_aid\\_180106.html](http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/pkk-mit-drogengeld-den-terror-finanziert_aid_180106.html)<accessed on 03.13.2016>
6. *German Daily NRZ*, March 30, 1993
7. Göksel, Timur. *Demonstrations in Lice, Turkey Linked to Cannabis Harvest*, *Al-Monitor*, June 12, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com>

- al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/turkey-lice-di-yarbakir-protests-cannabis-harvest.html, <accessed on 03.03.2016>
8. Hardinghaus, Barbara. *Duped by dope: Reality Trumps Ideals German Drug War*, Spiegel Online, March 21, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/drug-war-failing-in-germany-a-889826.html><accessed on 03.09.2016>
  9. Hurriyet Daily News, Police: PKK funds terrorism through drug trade, April 4, 1998, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-pkk-funds-terrorism-through-drug-trade.aspx?pageID=438&n=police-pkk-funds-terrorism-through-drug-trade-1998-04-04><accessed on 03.25.2016>
  10. McCraw, Steven C. Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington DC, May 20, 2003 <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/international-drug-trafficking-and-terrorism>
  11. Roy, Remi L. *How lucrative drug trafficking finances international terrorist organizations*, <http://www.alternet.org/drugs/how-lucrative-illegal-drug-trafficking-finances-international-terrorist-organizations><accessed on 03.03.2015>
  12. Retrieved from an Interview with Osman Ocalan, <http://rudaw.net/turkish/interview/13082015><accessed on 03.12.2016>
  13. Sabah Daily's News, *İngiltere'den PKK itirafı*, 24.01.2008, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/01/24/haber,85E08A44F125496DA69076E74948600F.html>, <accessed on 3.04.2016>
  14. *The Spectator*, 28 November-5 December 1998.
  15. Townsend, Mark. *Heroin Trade Continues to Claim Lives as UK Drug Gangs Compete for Power*, The Observer, Sunday 20 December 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/dec/20/heroin-gangs-london-wood-green-shooting><accessed on 04.02.2016>
  16. Turkey Today, Nos. 155-159, Turkey's Embassy in Washington, 1996

17. "US labels PKK drug smuggling kingpin", Today's Zaman, 2 June 2008; "US imposes sanctions on PKK group", BBC News, 30 May 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7428802.stm>
18. Wittrock, Philip. *Kurdish Propaganda and Patriotism: How the PKK Operates in Europe*, Spiegel Online International, July 11, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,565298,00.html><accessed on 03.01.2016>

### Reports and Documents

1. Bill McCollum, (e.d.), *Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Judiciary House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress Second Session, December 13, 2000, Serial No. 148
2. European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Report, 2014
3. Fragnito, Robert. STRATFOR Report, *PKK Funding: Operations and Methods*, [https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/8/8595\\_PKK%20FUNDING%20OPERATIONS%20AND%20METHODs.doc](https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/8/8595_PKK%20FUNDING%20OPERATIONS%20AND%20METHODs.doc)<accessed on 04.03.2016>
4. 'Kurds and Pay – Examining PKK Financing', Jane's Intelligence Review, 13 March 2008
5. Report for London Borough of Hackney, *Communities Views on the Government's Prevent Strategy Within Hackney*, January 2013, (London: Griffin Research and Consultancy Ltd, 2013)
6. Report in UN Office of Legal Affairs. *International Instruments related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism*. (New York, United Nations, 2001)
7. *Statement of Asa Hutchinson Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information*, DEA Congressional Testimony, March 13, 2002, <http://www.dea.gov/pr/speeches-testimony/2002t/ct031302p.html>

8. TUBIM, *National Drug Report* 2013. (Ankara: Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Publications, 2013)
9. Turkey Foreign Policy and Government Guide, Vol. 1, Annual Report, (International Business Publications, 2010)
10. Turkey's Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime 2004 Report, 2004
11. Turkey/United Kingdom Strategic Partnership Document, 27 July 2010, <http://ukinturkey.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/word/21520888/strategic-partnership-doc>
12. United Nations General Assembly, (1999), *International Convention for the Suppressing of the Financing of Terrorism*, Resolution 54/109, 9 December. Available at <http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm>
13. United Nations, Security Council. Resolution 1373 (2001), para. 4; S/RES/1373 (2001)
14. UNODC. (2012). *World Drug Report*. Vienna: United Nations Publications; Mincheva and Gurr, *Crime-Terror*
15. UNODC Heroin Report
16. UNODC Report, *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (Vienna: UNODC, 2010)
17. UNODC *World Drug Report*, 2010
18. UNODC *World Drug Report*, 2014
19. *U.S. News & World Report*, Vol. 126, N. 8-16, 1999
20. U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, "Five PKK Leaders Designated Narcotics Traffickers," April 20, 2011
21. World Customs Organization (WCO) *Reports on Heroin*, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/5.Heroin.pdf><accessed on 7.4.2016>
22. 2011 National Report to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Germany: New Developments, Trends and In-Depth Information on Selected Issues - Drug Situation 2010/2011" (German Reference Centre for the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (Deutsche Beobachtungsstelle fuer Drogen und



Drogensucht, DBDD), the Institute for Therapy Research (Institut fuer Therapieforschung, IFT), the Federal Centre for Health Education (Bundeszentrale fuer gesundheitliche Aufklaerung, BZgA) and the German Centre for Addiction Issues (Deutsche Hauptstelle fuer Suchtfragen, DHS)), (Lisbon, Portugal: EMCDDA, Nov. 2012)

# INDEX

## A

Abdeh, 27  
Afghanistan, 4, 7, 19, 21, 22,  
28, 29, 30, 38, 41, 82  
Africa, 13, 12, 41  
AIAI, 7  
Albany, 9  
American, 11, 65, 67, 83  
Asia, 13, 12, 28, 41, 67

## B

BBC, 53, 67  
Beirut, 27  
Belgium, 17, 47, 48, 50, 62, 63  
Berlin, 57  
Birmanian, 28  
BKA, 57, 59  
blackmailing, 4, 15, 36, 39  
British, 8, 10, 11, 44, 45, 48, 51,  
52, 53, 68, 80  
Bulgaria, 39, 42, 61

## C

Canadian, 48  
cartels, 5

child, 46

children, 4, 11, 43, 45, 46, 47,  
48, 55, 58

Columbia, 7

crime, 3, 4, 6, 8, 21, 25, 28, 30,  
39, 45, 54, 60, 75

criminal, 13, 6, 10, 16, 30, 35,  
43, 45, 55, 56, 59, 61, 68,  
69, 74

Cyprus, 6, 28, 39

## D

DEA, 15, 67, 68, 69, 86

Denmark, 11, 17, 64, 65

Diaspora, 11, 3, 24, 35, 37, 38,  
42, 58, 67, 77

donation, 15

drug, 11, 13, 14, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,  
9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19,  
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27,  
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36,  
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44,  
45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52,  
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,  
60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66,  
67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 82, 85

## E

ethnic, 13, 37, 54, 69

Europe, 13, 3, 4, 10, 12, 16, 17,  
23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35,  
36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44,  
45, 46, 47, 49, 52, 54, 55,  
59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68,  
74, 78, 79, 81, 83, 86

European, 5, 6, 11, 12, 16, 22,  
29, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43,  
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51,  
52, 53, 57, 60, 61, 63, 69,  
73, 74, 82, 86, 87

extortion, 4, 11, 17, 18, 24, 39,  
42, 44, 47, 48, 55, 58, 62,  
63, 68

## F

FARC, 15, 7, 61, 68, 78

FBI, 15, 7

financing, 4, 9, 19, 49, 57, 61,  
67

France, 11, 4, 17, 36, 39, 48,  
49, 50

French, 36, 49, 50

fund, 4, 10, 50, 52

## G

German, 16, 25, 36, 37, 44, 46,  
50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,  
84, 85, 87, 88

Germany, 11, 15, 4, 16, 17, 36,  
40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 56, 57,  
58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 77,  
84, 87

global, 3, 7, 26, 45

Golden Crescent, 21, 28, 38

Greece, 28, 39, 41, 42

Greek, 28

## H

Hackney Report, 55

heroin, 11, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27,  
29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38,  
39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50,  
51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61,  
63, 64, 67, 69, 85

## I

INCSR, 15, 69

Interpol, 43, 63

Iran, 3, 23, 28, 29, 30, 38, 41,  
42, 58, 63, 67, 81

Iraq, 5, 3, 23, 27, 30, 39, 53, 62,  
67, 81

Islamic, 7, 84

Italian, 37, 43, 47, 51, 63, 64

Italy, 11, 16, 4, 28, 39, 41, 47,  
63

illegal, 7, 8, 10, 15, 18, 19, 27,  
44, 47, 48, 49, 53, 55, 57,  
58, 60, 62, 65, 68, 73, 74

illicit, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 20, 21,  
22, 26, 39, 42, 46, 47, 51,  
52, 59, 68, 82

immigrant, 42, 51

immigration, 18

intelligence, 4, 25, 42, 57, 58

## K

KDP, 15, 30

KPU, 15, 30

Kurdish, 11, 15, 3, 12, 16, 17,  
18, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32,  
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42,  
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53,  
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60,  
61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 74, 77,  
80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86

- Kurdistan, 15, 4, 16, 18, 27, 48, 61, 82
- L**
- Laos, 28
- London, 5, 4, 6, 9, 10, 17, 30, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 77, 78, 79, 80, 84, 86
- Luxembourg, 48
- M**
- Medellin, 44
- Mediterranean, 39
- MED-TV, 48, 52, 80
- Milan, 63
- Miryan, 27
- N**
- narcotic, 3, 10, 15, 18, 28, 36, 47, 48, 64, 67
- narcotic money, 3, 10, 15, 47
- NATO, 15, 25, 42, 46, 81
- Netherlands, 11, 4, 17, 36, 61, 62, 63, 65
- network, 13, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 35, 46, 57, 61, 62, 69
- O**
- OGD, 15, 31
- organized crime, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, 24, 35, 36, 39, 42, 46, 47, 51, 54, 59, 60, 63, 64
- P**
- Pakistan, 7, 28, 38, 41
- Paris, 31, 36, 48, 50, 51
- PKK, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87
- rebel, 45
- robbery, 4, 11, 15, 17, 36, 39, 73
- S**
- Sayda, 27
- smuggling, 13, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 61, 65, 67, 73, 74, 86
- SOCA, 54
- Somalia, 7
- Sputnik, 11, 47, 48, 49
- STRATFOR, 50, 86
- Sur, 27
- T**
- Taliban, 7
- taxation, 18, 23, 24, 29, 67
- terror, 3, 5, 9, 10, 16, 20, 23, 25, 29, 32, 43, 46, 49, 54, 56, 59, 66, 73, 74, 84
- terrorism, 13, 14, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 30, 35, 43, 45, 54, 55, 57, 63, 68, 73, 74, 75, 78, 82, 85
- terrorist, 13, 14, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 31, 36, 38, 39, 42,

- 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 56,  
57, 59, 60, 61, 66, 67, 68,  
73, 74, 85
- Thailand, 28
- trafficking, 13, 14, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,  
8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20,  
22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29,  
30, 31, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,  
41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50,  
51, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62,  
63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69,  
74, 75, 78, 85
- transit, 10, 27, 38, 39, 61, 65,  
69
- tribute, 11, 15, 43
- Tripoli, 27
- TUBIM, 18, 31
- Turkey, 5, 10, 11, 13, 3, 4, 9,  
10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21,  
22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,  
30, 31, 32, 35, 38, 42, 43,  
44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52,  
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,  
61, 63, 64, 67, 69, 73, 74,  
77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87
- Turkish, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 24, 25,  
26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37,  
39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 49,  
50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57,  
58, 59, 60, 64, 66, 74, 80, 83
- U**
- UK / United Kingdom, 4, 45,  
48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 63
- UN / United Nations, 9, 31,  
42
- US / United States, 7, 18

# Financing The PKK Terrorism and Drug Trafficking

This book is an international security study. It is not enough to focus on just the consequences of terrorism, there are also political, economic and criminal causes that affect international security. Many factors sustain terrorism, but in this study on the connection between terror and drug trafficking we focus on just one – in the context of drug trafficking, we examine the PKK as a case study.

Findings of this study demonstrates that apart from being a ethnic-separatist terrorist organization threatening Turkey, PKK is notably active in drug business to finance its activities from Middle East to Europe. International drug trafficking is a type of crime that feeds all kinds of terrorism. PKK case indicates that drug trafficking and terrorism are simultaneous threats to the security of the international community.



## **Prof. Dr. Sedat LAÇİNER**

He is an academic on international and security studies. Ankara University (B.A), University of Sheffield (M.A), King's College London, University of London (PhD.).




## **Ahmet DOĞRU**

He is a researcher on the middle eastern politics. Bilkent University (B.A) International Relations, Middle East Technical University (M.A) Eurasian Studies, Gazi University (PhD. Candidate) International Relations.

**The Turkish Sun**

ISBN: 978-605-9642-17-0



[www.karincayayinlari.com](http://www.karincayayinlari.com)



[www.facebook.com/karincayayinlari](http://www.facebook.com/karincayayinlari)



[twitter.com/karincayayin](https://twitter.com/karincayayin)